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DEFINING AND DEMYSTIFYING AUTOMATED DECISION
SYSTEMS
RASHIDA RICHARDSON*
Government agencies are increasingly using automated decision
systems to aid or supplant human decision-making and policy enforcement
in various sensitive social domains. They determine who will have their food
subsidies terminated, how many health care benefits a person is entitled to,
and who is likely to be a victim of a crime. Yet, existing legislative and
regulatory definitions fail to adequately describe or clarify how these
technologies are used in practice and their impact on society. This failure to
adequately describe and define “automated decision systems” leads to such
systems evading scrutiny that policymakers are increasingly recognizing is
warranted and potentially impedes avenues for legal redress. Such
oversights can have concrete consequences for individuals and communities,
such as increased law enforcement harassment, deportation, denial of
housing or employment opportunities, and death.
This Article is the first in law review literature to provide two clear and
measured definitions of “automated decision systems” for legislative and
regulatory purposes and to suggest how these definitions should be applied.
The definitions and analytical framework offered in this Article clarify
automated decision systems as prominent modes of governance and social
control that warrant greater public scrutiny and immediate regulation. The
definitions foreground the social implications of these technologies in
addition to capturing the multifarious functions these technologies perform
as they relate to rights, liberties, public safety, access, and opportunities. To
demonstrate the significance and practicality of these definitions I analyze
and apply them to two modern use cases: teacher evaluation systems and
gang databases. I then explore how policymakers should determine
exemptions and evaluate two technologies routinely used in government:
email filters and accounting software. This law review provides a muchneeded intervention in global public policy discourse and interdisciplinary
scholarship regarding the regulation of emergent, data-driven technologies.
© 2022 Rashida Richardson.
* Rashida Richardson is a Visiting Scholar at Rutgers Law School and incoming Assistant
Professor of Law and Political Science at Northeastern University. The author appreciates the
helpful feedback on early drafts of this Article from Roel Dobbe, Ellen Goodman, Ben Green,
Kathryn Kovacs, Varoon Mathur, Kimberly Mutcherson, Jacob Russell, Carl Slater, Jr., Rick
Swedloff, Michael Thomas, Jr., and Meredith Whittaker. A special thanks to Theodora Dryer who
helped with an earlier draft of this project.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades the increased accessibility of vast amounts of
data and advancements in computational techniques and resources have
fueled what some call a “technological renaissance” where industry and
governments alike seek to use “big data” for a variety of tasks and interests.1
Yet, recurring public relations failures of these technologies not working as
marketed,2 producing stereotypical or biased outcomes,3 and leading to
unintended and sometimes fatal consequences4 have forced governments to
1. Accomplishments
and
Innovations,
ALLEGHENY
CNTY.,
https://www.alleghenycounty.us/Human-Services/News-Events/Accomplishments-andInnovations.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2021) (describing Allegheny County’s adoption of several
data-driven technology projects to address social issues).
2. See generally JOE FLOOD, THE FIRES: HOW A COMPUTER FORMULA BURNED DOWN NEW
YORK CITY—AND DETERMINED THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN CITIES (2010) (detailing the New
York City Fire Department’s use of an algorithmic system that made recommendations for fire
departments to close without increasing response time to fires that ultimately failed and resulted in
mass fires that killed and displaced thousands of people).
3. CATRIONA WILKEY ET AL., C4 INNOVATIONS, COORDINATED ENTRY SYSTEMS: RACIAL
EQUITY ANALYSIS OF ASSESSMENT DATA 8 (2019) (finding a housing prioritization algorithmic
system used in Washington State produced racially biased outcomes); Ziad Obermeyer et al.,
Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE
447 (2019) (finding evidence of racial bias in a widely used health care algorithm).
4. RASHIDA RICHARDSON ET AL., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW
CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 19–23 (2019). See
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consider policy interventions to address the variety of challenges presented
by the recent explosion in technological adoption. There is growing
recognition that the common practice of deploying technologies without
concomitant legal mechanisms to detect and mitigate attendant risks and
harms can no longer suffice. Yet, policymakers’ attempts at developing laws
and regulations are often stymied by the difficulty of defining these
technologies.5
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) and automated decision systems (“ADS”)
have become the most prominent categorical terms used to refer to the suite
of “big data” technologies and applications for legal and regulatory purposes.
Though “algorithm” is the term commonly used in public discourse to refer
to a variety of technologies and applications, this usage is a misnomer
because algorithms are computer-implementable methods that are inherent in
most technologies and applications, only some of which fit within the AI or
ADS categorical label. For example, an algorithm that is not AI or ADS is
the solving of a Rubik’s Cube.6
Some policymakers evade the difficulty of defining these terms by
focusing on particularly concerning functions7 or systems,8 categories of
generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017).
5. See, e.g., RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND,
CONFRONTING BLACK BOXES: A SHADOW REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED
DECISION SYSTEM TASK FORCE (2019) (describing a New York City government task force’s failed
effort to develop an ADS definition for legislation and regulations); CTR. FOR DATA ETHICS &
INNOVATION, REVIEW INTO BIAS IN ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING 67 (2020) (acknowledging
that the lack of standards or clear definitions of algorithmic systems makes it difficult to account
for the scale of adoption); NEW ZEALAND GOV’T, ALGORITHM CHARTER FOR AOTEAROA NEW
ZEALAND (2020) (noting the range of advanced techniques and tools that are referred to as
algorithms but failing to provide a definition in its consultation with New Zealand government
agencies).
6. Rubik’s,
You
Can
Do
the
Rubik’s
Cube:
Solution
Guide,
https://www.rubiks.com/media/guides/RBL_solve_guide_CUBE_US_5.375x8.375in_AW_27Feb
2020_VISUAL.pdf (describing the Rubik’s Cube as an algorithm); see also Sheila Jasanoff, Virtual,
Visible, and Actionable: Data Assemblages and the Sightlines of Justice, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–
Dec. 2017, at 1, 6 (“Though conceptualized in mathematical terms, an algorithm does the same kind
of work that a human eye might do in principle, combing and raking through masses of information
to discern patterned activities and transactions that would not arouse notice unless sorted and
aggregated.”).
7. The European General Data Protection Regulation’s primary provisions for compliance and
enforcement focus on the act of and actors performing processing of personal data. See Regulation
2016/679 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation]. Article 22
regulates automated processing of personal data, Article 30 requires companies to produce records
of data processing activities to aid compliance monitoring, and Article 32 sets out technical and
organizational standards for protecting, storing and processing personal data covered by the
regulation. Id. art. 22, 30, 32.
8. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS (Nov. 21,
2012) (establishing U.S. policy on autonomous weapons systems).
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risks,9 or specific effects and outcomes.10 Other policymakers have relied on
technical and mathematical terms or descriptions to define or explain the
meaning of AI and ADS in order to avoid inclusion of seemingly mundane
or routinely used technologies.11 While the functionality of such systems are
typically communicated in mathematical or technical terms, technical
language is informed by and meant for discipline-specific contexts because
it enables those who use the language to “say more in a more comprehensible,
thorough, and exact way, using less time and fewer words than . . . ordinary
English.”12 Thus, when technical language is heedlessly used in statutory or
regulatory text, its misapplication can lead to misinterpretations that can
frustrate the law’s purpose.13 It can also pose challenges for legal
compliance, enforcement, and judicial interpretations due to sector or
discipline-related semantic ambiguities.14
9. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain
Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021) [hereinafter Proposal] (proposing a
risk-based regulation for the development and use of AI systems); 2022 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 35,
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-119.5 (regulating the use of AI in hiring, compensation, and other human
resource-related decisions).
10. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7, at 46 (“The data subject shall have the
right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”); 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008) (regulating the collection and storage of biometric information).
11. Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act, A.B. 2269, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2020) (“‘Automated decision system’ . . . means a computational process, including one derived
from machine learning, statistics, or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, that
makes a decision or facilitates human decision making, that impacts persons.”); Int. No. 1696-A,
Law No. 2018/049 (N.Y.C. Council, enacted Jan. 11, 2018) (“The term ‘automated decision system’
means computerized implementations of algorithms, including those derived from machine learning
or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, which are used to make or assist in
making decisions.”); OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence,
OECD/LEGAL/0449, at 7 (2021) (“An AI system is a machine-based system that can, for a given
set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing real
or virtual environments.”); SING. DIGIT., MODEL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK 18 (2d ed. 2020) (“AI technologies rely on AI algorithms to generate models. The
most appropriate model(s) is/are selected and deployed in a production system.”).
12. Mary Jane Morrison, Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
271, 306 (1989) (describing the development and utility of mathematical and technical language for
discipline-specific contexts).
13. Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
999, 1032–33 (2013) (describing the various challenges and consequences that stem from poorly
constructed statutory definitions).
14. STEPHEN C. REA, INST. FOR MONEY, TECH. & FIN. INCLUSION, A SURVEY OF FAIR AND
RESPONSIBLE MACHINE LEARNING AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER
FINANCIAL SERVICES 20–25 (2020) (describing semantic gaps with respect to how AI fairness is
used in different disciplines and contexts); see also Tressie McMillan Cottom, Where Platform
Capitalism and Racial Capitalism Meet: The Sociology of Race and Racism in the Digital Society,
6 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 441, 443 (2020) (arguing that reliance on needlessly complex
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AI and ADS are socio-technical systems that depend on and must be
responsive to the contextual settings in which they function.15 Yet, the failure
to incorporate such reflexivity in legal definitions reinforces the mythology
of mathematics and algorithm-based technologies by shrouding these
technologies with a veneer of legitimacy because their primary functions are
expressed in mathematical or technical terms.16 For example, in the criminal
justice context, whether the constitutional standard of probable cause is met
can hinge on the accuracy and reliability of a technology used to determine
issues of fact (e.g., the use of facial recognition to determine the identity of a
suspect in a crime scene image).17 Accuracy and reliability are typically
represented through mathematical terminology such as “true positive” or
“false positive,” but these metrics alone lack the context needed to interpret
their true implications under situational circumstances and can mislead
decisionmakers into assuming that accuracy is a simple binary rather than a
spectrum.18

technical jargon is an obfuscation strategy used by individual and institutional actors to inhibit
access to information that could reveal inherent biases in technology).
15. See GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT:
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 24 (1999) (“Algorithms for codification do not resolve
the moral questions involved, although they may obscure them.”); Scott Decker & Kimberly
Kempf-Leonard, Constructing Gangs: The Social Definition of Youth Activities, 5 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 271, 286 (1991) (“Since the definition of problems—both their nature and magnitude—
drives policy, a clear definition of ‘the problem’ is needed before goals can be set, responses
formulated, policies implemented and outcomes evaluated. A number of policies are dependent
upon such a definition.”).
16. Matteo Pasquinelli & Vladan Joler, The Nooscope Manifested: AI as Instrument of
Knowledge Extractivism, 36 AI & SOC’Y 1263, 1270 (2020) (“Given the degree of myth-making
and social bias around its mathematical constructs, AI has indeed inaugurated the age of statistical
science fiction.”); OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., COMING TO TERMS WITH CHANCE: ENGAGING RATIONAL
DISCRIMINATION AND CUMULATIVE DISADVANTAGE 7 (2016) (arguing that mathematical formulas
and scientific approaches to social problems have achieved a “special, nearly mystical social status”
of being accepted without significant inquiry).
17. See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 886–92 (2016).
18. See, e.g., Pete Fussey, Bethan Davies & Martin Innes, ‘Assisted’ Facial Recognition and
the Reinvention of Suspicion and Discretion in Digital Policing, 61 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 325,
332–41 (2021) (noting groups of factors that must be evaluated to understand how facial recognition
functions in practice); Karen Hao & Jonathan Stray, Can You Make AI Fairer than a Judge? Play
Our
Courtroom
Algorithm
Game,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Oct.
17,
2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/10/17/75285/ai-fairer-than-judge-criminal-riskassessment-algorithm/ (simulating how to understand accuracy and fairness concerns regarding
predictive algorithms in judicial decision-making); Aakash Bindal, Measuring Just Accuracy Is Not
Enough in Machine Learning, A Better Technique Is Required.., MEDIUM (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://medium.com/techspace-usict/measuring-just-accuracy-is-not-enough-in-machine-learninga-better-technique-is-required-e7199ac36856 (describing how only measuring accuracy of a
machine learning model may not fully capture or communicate the efficacy and reliability of the
model).
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Despite their integral role to our understanding of and the success of
legislation and regulations,19 legal definitions remain under-examined by
legal and social science scholarship, and legislative drafting manuals pay
scant attention to this part of the drafting process, with few manuals offering
tactical or substantive guidance. A review of state legislative drafting
manuals revealed that most manuals only provide generic advice on drafting
or the purpose of definitions, and some were completely silent on
definitions.20 This lack of attention and guidance is significant because the
scope, application, and meaning of statutory definitions are a frequent source
of federal litigation.21 When definitions are absent or poorly constructed,
statutes and regulations are susceptible to normal evolutions in word meaning
and varying interpretations, which can ultimately lead to invalidation.22
Nonetheless, legal definitions remain important instruments of
governance.23
By giving meaning to terms as applied to factual
circumstances, legal definitions can resolve ambiguity and communicate
meaning to various audiences that interact with and relate to statutes and
regulations differently (e.g., lawyers, judges, civil servants, corporations, the
public).24 Definitions create constraints for both legal and normative
inquiries, designating the relevant contexts or circumstances for applying
statutes and regulations and establishing limits of legal liability and coercive
outcomes.25 It is through this authoritative and inherently political function

19. AUDREY AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, RETHINKING VALUE-ADDED MODELS IN EDUCATION:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TESTS AND ASSESSMENT-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (2014) (“By
definition, a public policy is in itself a tool used by governments to define a course of action that
will ultimately lead to a high-level, supreme, and desirable end.”).
20. Delaware’s legislative drafting manual was an exception because it provided substantive
and tactical advice on definition drafting in more than one section of the manual. LEGIS. COUNCIL’S
DIV. OF RSCH., DELAWARE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL (2019); see also Grace E. Hart, State
Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 438 (2016) (surveying
state legislative drafting manuals to highlight common features and omissions and how these
manuals affect statutory interpretation).
21. See Price, supra note 13, at 1001–02.
22. Id. at 1009.
23. Here and throughout this Article, I use the term governance to “suggest that these policies
are not selected according to narrow instrumental criteria such as efficiency and cost-effectiveness,
but rather according to complex political [and social] goals and considerations . . . .” Katherine
Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 43, 55 n.1 (2016).
24. Price, supra note 13, at 1031; Yaniv Roznai, ‘A Bird Is Known by Its Feathers’—On the
Importance and Complexities of Definitions in Legislation, 2 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 145 (2014).
25. Margaret Burnham, Was Ahmaud Arbery Lynched and Why Does It Matter?, CIV. RTS. &
RESTORATIVE JUST. (May 9, 2020), https://crrj.org/2020/05/was-ahmaud-arbery-lynched-andwhy-does-it-matter/ (highlighting Civil Rights advocates’ intentions to create a broad legal
definition of lynching so murders in collusion with state actors and police killings were not
perfunctorily excluded by apathetic prosecutors).
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that legal definitions help provide legal certainty and uniformity because they
limit the scope of areas where a law seeks to regulate, where a law’s
normative provisions have effect, and where interpreters can venture.26
Creating legal definitions pertaining to technology is particularly vexed
because of the co-constitutive nature of technology and society—they enable
and influence as much as they limit and catechize one another.27 Throughout
history, various kinds of technologies have become embedded in the
conditions of modern politics and society, often without regard to their
attendant consequences.28 Policymakers and consumers alike narrowly focus
on the stated or professed uses and outcomes of a technology, which diverts
attention from tacit functions, such as managing power and social dynamics
or facilitating exclusionary practices that privilege some over others.29
Such parochial conceptions of technology can also influence two
problematic tendencies, particularly amongst policymakers.
First,
policymakers tend to focus on “the retreating horizon of systems still-to-becreated at the risk of passing over autonomous systems already in place.”30
Second, policymakers tend to undervalue or misconstrue demonstrable risks
and harms by assuming that flaws are a necessary social cost for innovation,
which normalizes problems rather than regulating them.31
26. Price, supra note 13, at 1019–26; Roznai, supra note 24, at 145–46.
27. See generally STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL
ORDER (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004). See also Sandra G. Harding, Objectivity and Diversity, in
ENCYC. OF DIVERSITY IN EDUC. 1625–30 (James A. Banks ed., 2012),
https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/diversityineducation/n522.xml.
28. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
318 (1975) (alleging Robert Moses designed the Southern State Parkway with low bridges to
exclude Black residents that would rely on chartered buses to access Long Island, New York);
Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against Women,
REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobsautomation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-womenidUSKCN1MK08G (describing an AI hiring software that downgraded women’s resumes); Ben
Hutchinson et al., Unintended Machine Learning Biases as Social Barriers for Persons with
Disabilities, 125 SIGACCESS
(SIG Access, New York, NY), Oct. 2019,
http://sigaccess.org/newsletter/2019-10/hutchinson.html.
29. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
318 (1975) (alleging Robert Moses designed the Southern State Parkway with low bridges to
exclude Black residents that would rely on chartered buses to access Long Island, New York);
Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against Women,
REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobsautomation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-womenidUSKCN1MK08G (describing an AI hiring software that downgraded women’s resumes);
Hutchinson et al., supra note 28.
30. P.M. Krafft et al., Defining AI in Policy Versus Practice, PROC. 2020 AAA/CM CONF. ON
AI, ETHICS, & SOC’Y (AIES) 6 (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.11095.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Shea Swauger, Our Bodies Encoded: Algorithmic Test Proctoring in Higher
Education, HYBRID PEDAGOGY (Apr. 2, 2020), https://hybridpedagogy.org/our-bodies-encoded-
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AI and ADS are similar to laws in that they both can construct social
reality by reflecting and preserving power relations and social conditions.32
Therefore, legal definitions of AI and ADS that demonstrate awareness of the
social and political dimensions of the policymaking process and of the
technology itself can serve as an important public policy intervention.
“[D]efinition inevitably—sometimes subtly, sometimes radically—changes
meaning even as it tries to accurately reflect it.”33 So, modernizing the
meanings of AI and ADS for legislation and regulation can “fundamentally
change[] the exercise of power and the experience of citizenship.”34
In this Article, I focus on defining automated decision systems used by
government agencies and actors, but the definitions can also apply to private
uses and actors. This particular domain is both an active area of public policy
development and an area ripe for intervention in light of how modern
governance operates. In 2018, the Canadian federal government issued a
directive on ADS and implemented an Algorithmic Impact Assessment
(“AIA”) questionnaire through the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the
federal government body that reviews and approves spending by the
Government of Canada, including procurement of technologies.35 This AIA
was designed to help government agencies “assess and mitigate the impacts
associated with deploying an automated decision system.”36 In the United
States, ADS have been the focus of governmental task forces or commissions
seeking to evaluate current uses and identify necessary legislative or

algorithmic-test-proctoring-in-higher-education/ (describing the various risks and harms associated
with algorithmic test proctoring that remain unregulated and unscrutinized by policymakers and
educational officials); United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 348 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (“I do not for a moment contend that hot spot policing is free of problems . . . . But by
stripping departments of effective public safety programs . . . courts risk inducing police officers to
simply abandon inner cities as part of their mission.”).
32. Roznai, supra note 24, at 164. See generally SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF
OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018).
33. Price, supra note 13, at 1017.
34. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE
OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 20 (1986); see also STUART RUSSELL, HUMAN COMPATIBLE: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL 105 (2019) (describing how human behavior can
be subtly changed by modifying the information environment, which can be enabled through the
use of AI and ADS).
35. Directive on Automated Decision Making, R.S.C. 1985, c F-11 (Can.).
36. Algorithmic Impact Assessment, GOV’T. OF CAN. (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://open.canada.ca/aia-eia-js/?; see also Michael Karlin & Noel Corriveau, The Government of
Canada’s Algorithmic Impact Assessment: Take Two, MEDIUM: SUPERGOVERNANCE (Aug. 7,
2018), https://medium.com/@supergovernance/the-government-of-canadas-algorithmic-impactassessment-take-two-8a22a87acf6f.
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regulatory reforms,37 litigation challenging biased and harmful outcomes
produced by the use of ADS,38 and proposed legislation or regulations
seeking to provide transparency and accountability regarding current and
future ADS use.39 In Europe, most relevant laws focus on the outcomes of
automated processing or high-risk AI rather than ADS specifically,40 but
there have been legal challenges to government use of specific ADS and
government commissioned research on ADS policy frameworks.41
Currently, no countries in the Global South have laws or regulations focused
on ADS, but there is a growing body of research and public scrutiny
regarding government use of some ADS.42
Government use of ADS is also a ripe area for intervention not only
because it implicates particular legal interests and concerns, but also because
unfettered and unexamined use of ADS can distort perceptions of
government operations, thus making deferred reform or regulation difficult
and deficient. For example, in 2014, Boston Public Schools attempted to
address decades of de facto racial and socioeconomic segregation in public
schools by implementing a “home-based assignment” ADS.43 This ADS was
geographically driven and attempted to improve school choice options closer
to the student’s home address. However, a 2018 evaluation of this ADS
project revealed that it failed to achieve most of its goals and the ADS
37. N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED
DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT 3 (2019); VT. A.I. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 4 (2020)
(focusing on public and private use of AI in Vermont but also evaluating ADS generally).
38. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; AI NOW INST., CTR. ON RACE, INEQ. & L. & ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS: CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT USE OF
ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 3 (2018) [hereinafter LITIGATING ALGORITHMS].
39. See, e.g., Algorithmic Accountability Act, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019); H.B. 1655, 66th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); Int. No. 1806-A, Law No. 2022/035 (N.Y.C. Council, enacted Jan.
15, 2022); Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act, A.B. 2269, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2020).
40. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7, art. 22; Proposal, supra note 9, at
21.
41. See, e.g., Rechtbank Den Haag [Court of the Hague] 5 februari 2020, Case No. C-09550982-HA ZA 18-388, m.nt (NJCM/the Netherlands) (Neth.) (finding that Dutch public authorities
use of public benefits fraud detection ADS to be an unlawful violation of the right to privacy);
ANSGAR KOENE ET. AL, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR
ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 1 (2019).
42. See Vidushi Marda & Shivangi Narayan, Data in New Delhi’s Predictive Policing System,
FAT* ’20: PROC. 2020 CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, & TRANSPARENCY (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372865; Subhashish Panigrahi, #MarginalizedAadhaar: Is
India’s Aadhaar Enabling More Exclusion in Social Welfare for Marginalized Communities?,
GLOBALVOICES
(Feb.
17,
2020,
10:14
GMT),
https://globalvoices.org/2020/02/17/marginalizedaadhaar-is-indias-aadhaar-enabling-moreexclusion-in-social-welfare-for-marginalized-communities/.
43. BOS. AREA RSCH. INITIATIVE, AN EVALUATION OF EQUITY IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC
SCHOOLS’ HOME-BASED ASSIGNMENT POLICY 1 (2018).
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actually intensified segregation across the city’s public schools.44 Luckily,
in this case, Boston Public Schools commissioned an evaluation of this ADS
project that revealed it was a failure, but most current government ADS
projects lack meaningful transparency and retrospective evaluations.45 This
means that ADS can be implemented and fail without public awareness or
scrutiny, and government officials can leverage this information asymmetry
to advance narratives of progress as structural conditions worsen or to avoid
necessary reforms.
Decades of research suggests that statistical models, like those
commonly employed in ADS, outperform human experts on prognostic and
optimization tasks.46 These findings, along with ADS marketing claims of
increased efficiency, cost-savings, and even bias reduction, make their
integration into modern governance seem like a logical progression.47
Modern government decision-making is significantly diffused yet structured,
where decisions are delegated and distributed across multiple actors within a
hierarchical organizational structure, so ADS should ideally “improve
consistency, decrease bias, and lower costs.”48 Yet, this logic is not
normatively grounded because it ignores the role of pre-existing social
inequities, how discretion and power dynamics operate within this evolved
governance structure, and it assumes that technologically mediated decisionmaking is neutral. Such oversights can conceal inherent tradeoffs associated
with ADS use or belie government decision-making and policy
implementation,49 both of which are pertinent to evaluating the value and
44. Id. at 68.
45. Maria De-Arteaga et al., A Case for Humans-in-the-Loop: Decisions in the Presence of
Erroneous Algorithmic Scores, CHI ’20: PROC. OF THE 2020 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYS. 1–2 (Apr. 21, 2020), Error! Hyperlink reference not
valid.https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3313831.3376638 (noting that technical issues with ADS
are common but organizations are rarely transparent about their occurrence); Letter from Ron
Wyden, U.S. Senator, et al., to the Honorable Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Apr.
15, 2021) (asking that Department of Justice-funded predictive policing projects be retrospectively
reviewed).
46. PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 91–92 (1954); Stefanía Ægisdóttir et al., The MetaAnalysis of Clinical Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on Clinical Versus
Statistical Prediction, 34 COUNSELING PSYCH. 341 (2006); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus
Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1671 (1989).
47. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 8 (2015); David Scharfenberg, Computers Can Solve Your Problem.
You
May
Not
Like
the
Answer.,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://apps.bostonglobe.com/ideas/graphics/2018/09/equity-machine; FLOOD, supra note 2, at 68.
48. Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1855–58 (2019) (describing modern government decision-making systems
and the incorporation of ADS).
49. EDWARD TENNER, THE EFFICIENCY PARADOX: WHAT BIG DATA CAN’T DO, at xv (2018).
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performance of ADS in the government context. Neglecting these concerns
also eschews questions related to capitalism, imperialism, and other
subjugating phenomena that are aligned with market interests. Thus, creating
a normatively grounded and reflexive definition of ADS is the necessary
premise for any meaningful legislative or regulatory reform.
In this Article, I offer two nested definitions of ADS—one
comprehensive and one narrow—developed through a series of workshops
with a group of interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners50 that can be used
in legislation and proposed regulations:
Comprehensive ADS Definition: “Automated Decision System” is any
tool, software, system, process, function, program, method, model, and/or
formula designed with or using computation to automate, analyze, aid,
augment, and/or replace government decisions, judgments, and/or policy
implementation. Automated decision systems impact opportunities, access,
liberties, safety, rights, needs, behavior, residence, and/or status by
predicting, scoring, analyzing, classifying, demarcating, recommending,
allocating, listing, ranking, tracking, mapping, optimizing, imputing,
inferring, labeling, identifying, clustering, excluding, simulating, modeling,
assessing, merging, processing, aggregating, and/or calculating.
Narrow ADS Definition: “Automated Decision Systems” are any
systems, software, or processes that use computation to aid or replace
government decisions, judgments, and/or policy implementation that impact
opportunities, access, liberties, rights, and/or safety. Automated Decision
Systems can involve predicting, classifying, optimizing, identifying, and/or
recommending.
Two definitions are warranted because the current ADS policy
landscape is oriented around two distinct goals that require different
assumptions, approaches, and definitional constraints. One policy goal
assumes uncertainty or incompleteness regarding the complexities of the
problem and seeks to better understand ADS as currently and prospectively
implemented to then inform subsequent reform. This policy goal requires a
descriptive definition that aims to expand ordinary meanings or usage of
terms by depicting attributes of what is defined, and not to rigidly establish
boundaries of the definition.51 The comprehensive definition meets this goal
50. Workshop participants included: Amba Kak, Ben Green, Erin McElroy, Genevieve Fried,
Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Meredith Whittaker, Roel Dobbe, Theodora Dryer, and Varoon Mathur.
Together this group covered a range of disciplinary and relevant work experiences, which allowed
us to explore various aspects of ADS design, procurement, uses, and outcomes (material and
inconsequential). The group’s expertise and experience includes, but is not limited to, private sector
technology development, public sector technology policy, machine learning, civil and human rights
law, and history of technology and computing.
51. Price, supra note 13, at 1010–13 (2013).
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because it is an intentionally inclusive definition designed for legislation and
regulations that are investigatory or diagnostic in purpose.
The
comprehensive definition can be used in legislation that seeks to create a task
force, commission, other quasi-government bodies, or governmentcommissioned studies that seek to understand ADS use and its implications.
The comprehensive definition can also be used in legislation or regulations
mandating the enumeration of ADS in use. These types of legislative or
regulatory approaches are typically created to inform more prescriptive
interventions, which is where the second policy goal and definition take
effect.
The second policy goal makes some assumptions regarding the nature
of the problem and conditions relevant to governance, and it seeks to assign
obligations, invest rights, mitigate risks, and create greater accountability and
responsibility regarding the development and use of ADS. This policy goal
requires a prescriptive definition that consists of a set of conditions, where
compliance with each is necessary to fall within the scope of the definition
and therefore the reach of relevant laws.52 The narrow definition is honed for
legislation and regulations that are restrictive in purpose or onerous in
practice. This narrow definition can be used in legislation that seeks to ban
or limit uses of ADS (generally or in specific sectors) or regulations and laws
that mandate stringent requirements for ADS use, such as disclosure or audit
requirements.
Prevailing statutory and regulatory ADS definitions fall short in meeting
these policy goals because they are neither precise nor clarifying, which leads
to two significant problems for ADS legislation or regulations to be
successful.53 First, prevailing definitions infer cultural baselines of
expectations and presume knowledge, or at least a shared level of
comprehension, amongst various audiences that must interpret the definitions
and relevant laws. For instance, definitions that merely adopt mathematical
or technical terms like “linear regression” or “neural networks”54 assume that
the public, judges, lawyers, and government actors charged with enforcing,

52. Id.
53. See supra note 11.
54. E.g., 2022 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 35, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-119.5 (“The term
‘automated employment decision tool’ means any system whose function is governed by statistical
theory, or systems whose parameters are defined by such systems, including inferential
methodologies, linear regression, neural networks, decision trees, random forests, and other learning
algorithms . . . .”); Directive on Automated Decision Making, supra note 35 (“Automated Decision
System [i]ncludes any technology that either assists or replaces the judgement of human decisionmakers. These systems draw from fields like statistics, linguistics, and computer science, and use
techniques such as rules-based systems, regression, predictive analytics, machine learning, deep
learning, and neural nets.”).
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conforming to, and interpreting relevant laws or regulations know what these
terms mean or can reasonably ascertain the correct meaning consistently.
Second, prevailing definitions present a time-bound conceptual framing
of ADS that is limited to current capabilities and stripped of social, political,
and economic forces and contexts. Some definitions suggest that ADS are
technologies that merely aid human decision-makers using a range of
techniques,55 but such characterizations often fail to anticipate that current
techniques and technical capabilities can and will evolve.56 The omissions in
these definitions also downplay the fact that many of the technical actions or
functions performed by ADS are inherently normative or value-laden,57 and
they tend to efface the nature of decisions made using ADS and thus the
significance of their impact.58
A major task of this Article is to change the meaning of ADS, and
therefore the impact of relevant statutes and regulations, by accurately
reflecting what ADS are actually doing and their impact in a sector-agnostic
manner. This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I further situates the
comprehensive and narrow definitions of ADS. It describes the key
components of each definition and their relevance for ADS regulation. This
Part clarifies why my definitional project creates a new modality of
regulation that does not presume knowledge or expertise amongst the various
stakeholders and audiences within or affected by the broader ADS policy and
regulatory landscape.
Part II explores two examples of ADS currently used by government
agencies in the United States: teacher evaluation systems and gang databases.
Each use case details the social and political history that engendered the
development of these particular ADS and how these technologies are
practically implemented. I apply each ADS case study to the narrow
definition to demonstrate how these ADS could otherwise evade scrutiny in
the absence of the definitions and how the clarity offered through the
55. See, e.g., Directive on Automated Decision Making, supra note 35.
56. Yann LeCun, Deep Learning Hardware: Past, Present, and Future, 2019 IEEE INT’L
SOLID-STATE CIR. CONF. 16 (2019), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8662396.
57. See Anthony Danna & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Digging Beneath
the Surface of Data Mining, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 378 (2002) (arguing that data mining techniques
enable risk and value-based categorization); BOWKER & STAR, supra note 15, at 6 (“For any
individual, group or situation, classifications and standards give advantage or they give suffering.”).
58. Compare GANDY, JR., supra note 16, at 30 (“Less well known are the ways in which the
classification of a person as high risk actually results in their being placed at risk, including the risk
of physical harm.”), with Ben Green & Yiling Chen, Algorithmic Risk Assessments Can Alter
Human Decision-Making Processes in High-Stakes Government Contexts, PROC. ACM ON HUM.COMPUT. INTERACTION, Oct. 2021, at 13 (finding risk assessment use alters an actor’s decisionmaking process to focus more on risk. In the bail context this means risk became a stronger
determinant in decisions).
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definitions is valuable within each sectoral context. This Part is intended to
clarify the political and social dimensions of ADS within their sectoral
contexts as well as demonstrate how the definitions bring new meaning and
urgency to ADS that are often misconstrued as neutral or passive.
Part III evaluates potential exemptions to the ADS definitions. This Part
examines three technologies commonly used by government agencies and
demonstrates how policymakers should holistically analyze exemptions for
ADS legislation and regulations.
The Conclusion fastens analytical threads developed in the preceding
Parts to reveal how the definitions and analysis bring new understandings to
the problems of ADS. While some ADS appear to be new or novel, the
problems and concerns they present are not, and this Article provides
policymakers, advocates, and the public with a new framework and insights
for addressing them.
I. TWO DEFINITIONS OF AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS
Conventionally, the American legal system has dealt with emergent
technologies and their attendant policy concerns under distinct issue spaces
that are governed by separate regulatory bodies, legal frameworks, and
processes—e.g., privacy, intellectual property, antitrust, consumer
protection, security, and telecommunications. Yet, this institutional and
jurisdictional configuration becomes less ideal and practically challenging
when a technology’s design, use, and impact is trans-substantive and
implicates more than one of these distinct issue spaces. Government use of
ADS occupies this problem space, which is why policymakers are seeking
alternative or novel approaches to regulation.
Globally, governments seeking to regulate ADS are interested in using
categorical, conceptual, and technology-neutral definitions because they can
help clarify the suitability of existing legal rules, broaden the reach of laws
beyond present-day sectoral or institutional configurations, and potentially
withstand the pace of innovation.59 Such definitions can also enable greater

59. See, e.g., Consultation on the OPC’s Proposals for Ensuring Appropriate Regulation of
Artificial Intelligence, OFF. OF THE PRIV. COMM’R OF CAN. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/completedconsultations/consultation-ai/pos_ai_202001/ (describing interest in privacy laws remaining
technologically neutral and soliciting feedback on suitability of current regulatory frameworks);
Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European Approach to Excellence and Trust,
COM (2020) 65 final, at 16 (Feb. 19, 2020) (“In any new legal instrument, the definition of AI will
need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate technical progress while being precise enough to
provide the necessary legal certainty.”).
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global cooperation amongst governments with different legal frameworks.60
Yet, legal scholarship offers little to no aid or clarity in achieving this
objective. Legal scholarship on government use of ADS often focuses on
specific technologies or sectoral uses,61 and scholarship that employs
categorical terms like ADS tends to avoid definitions, instead providing
detailed descriptions or illustrative examples as conceptual guidance that
cannot be adopted or used in legislative or regulatory drafting.62
Though the challenge of crafting legislative and regulatory definitions
for controversial and rapidly evolving technologies is not new, history also
offers little guidance on how to do this in a way that meets policymakers’
objectives regarding ADS regulation. For instance, in the late 1990s,
following the announcement that Scottish scientists successfully cloned a
sheep, governmental bodies around the world began to debate the ethics of
cloning and the need for regulation that would not stymie genetic research.63
This led to a patchwork of policies with inconsistent definitions of cloning,
globally and throughout the United States.64 Cloning definitions in
legislative proposals in the United States used highly technical language that
focused on restricting or permitting specific procedures available at the
time.65 Other countries, like Canada, adopted more expansive and conceptual
definitions that could encompass more speculative cloning technologies that
may arise in the future.66 Some argue that the lack of a comprehensive
national policy on cloning, including consistent definitions, put the United
States behind many other countries, and the lack of global consensus has left
60. JOSHUA P. MELTZER ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE IMPORTANCE AND OPPORTUNITIES
TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON AI (2020) (emphasizing the importance of global
cooperation on AI regulation that allows governments to maintain legal rules and values).
61. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2014); Sean Allan Hill, Bail Reform and the
(False) Racial Promise of Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 68 UCLA L. REV. 910 (2021) (describing
the use of pre-trial risk assessments); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias
Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2020) (describing algorithmic hiring systems).
62. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 613 (2019) (describing algorithmic decision-making and offering illustrative
examples); Strandburg, supra note 48, at 1856–57 (comparing automated decision tools to
delegated, distributed decision procedures without offering a definition). But see Aziz Z. Huq,
Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1060–62 (2019) (offering a
succinct definition of algorithmic criminal justice with analysis of each definitional component).
63. Witherspoon Council, Preface: Cloning Then and Now, NEW ATLANTIS (2015),
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/preface-cloning-then-and-now.
64. Witherspoon Council, Part Four: Cloning Policy in the United States, NEW ATLANTIS,
(2015), https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/preface-cloning-then-and-now [hereinafter
Cloning Policy]; Shaun D. Pattinson & Timothy Caulfield, Variations and Voids: The Regulation
of Human Cloning Around the World, BMC MED. ETHICS, Dec. 13, 2004.
65. See Cloning Policy, supra note 64.
66. Id.
OF
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many countries in an uncertain regulatory position that offers no clear
direction for scientists.67
With this context in mind, I led a series of workshops with a group of
interdisciplinary scholars to develop two nested definitions of ADS
(comprehensive and narrow) that would meet the aforementioned policy
goals of governments contemplating ADS regulations in addition to
providing clarity to the variety of audiences that must comprehend ADS
definitions and corresponding laws. Each definition has four components
that are necessary to achieve systematic and normatively grounded
evaluations to identify ADS, consistent interpretations of ADS for
compliance and enforcement, and a more holistic understanding of ADS use
and risks for future policy development. Once explicated, the definitional
components demonstrate how these nested definitions can enable new
modalities of ADS regulation.
First, the definitions clarify that ADS can exist in many forms, but all
rely on computation.68 This is expressed as “any tool, software, system,
process, function, program, method, model, and/or formula designed with or
using computation” in the comprehensive definition and “any systems,
software, or processes that use computation” in the narrow definition. ADS
rely on a variety of computing architectures that can range from simple
regression and decision tree models to complex deep learning models. Thus,
the configurations of ADS can vary greatly. This fact is often unappreciated
or misconstrued because public perceptions of ADS are distorted by which
breakthroughs or controversies receive media attention.69 If the public only
hears about robots, iris scanners, virtual reality headsets, and other
breakthroughs that bear little relation to what is commonly used in
government or typically happens in most research labs or product
development teams, then it is less likely that inconspicuous ADS will be
identifiable as a spreadsheet,70 mathematical formulas, or in paper form, like

67. See id.; Pattinson & Caulfield, supra note 64; see also Preetika Rana, How a Chinese
Scientist Broke the Rules to Create the First Gene-Edited Babies, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2019, 12:44
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-chinese-scientist-broke-the-rules-to-create-the-firstgene-edited-babies-11557506697.
68. See Peter J. Denning, What Is Computation?: Opening Statement, UBIQUITY (Nov. 2010),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/1880066.1880067.
69. RUSSELL, supra note 34, at 62–65.
70. For example, a 2017 class action lawsuit revealed that a computational formula in an Excel
spreadsheet was used to cut Medicaid benefits by twenty or thirty percent for 3,600 individuals with
developmental and intellectual disabilities. K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703 (D. Idaho
2016). The reduction to health care services via Excel worsened the health conditions of some
plaintiffs and was ultimately found to be unconstitutional. Id. at 720; Jay Stanley, Pitfalls of
Artificial Intelligence Decisionmaking Highlighted in Idaho ACLU Case, ACLU: FREE FUTURE
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some pretrial risk assessments. Thus, clarifying what to look for can aid ADS
identification and ensure mundane or passive-appearing ADS are not
overlooked.
Second, the definitions clarify the various ways ADS are used by
government agencies. This is expressed as “to automate, analyze, aid,
augment, and/or replace government decisions, judgments, and/or policy
implementation” in the comprehensive definition and “to aid or replace
government decisions, judgments, and/or policy implementation” in the
narrow definition. ADS are increasingly adopted by government agencies to
support or replace governance functions traditionally performed by humans,
in whole or in part.71 Yet, the role of ADS and the autonomy of government
actors can vary significantly, and both aspects are pertinent to understanding
and evaluating ADS performance and impact.72
Research on human compliance with ADS recommendations note two
competing tendencies that stem from the type of task in which ADS are
involved and the level of autonomy government actors retain: algorithmic
aversion and automation bias.73 Algorithmic aversion is the tendency to
ignore or override ADS recommendations after seeing that they can be
erroneous.74 This problem typically arises from the lack of autonomy
government actors retain and the lack of transparency of the ADS.75
Conversely, automation bias is the tendency to follow the ADS
recommendations despite evidence that would indicate the ADS is faulty.
This problem arises when the task is complex or high-stakes and when a
(June 2, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/pitfalls-artificialintelligence-decisionmaking-highlighted-idaho-aclu-case.
71. See, e.g., DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
IN
FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
(2020),
https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf (highlighting AI usage
by federal agencies for decision-making, analysis, adjudication, service delivery and other
functions);
ALGORITHM
WATCH,
AUTOMATING
SOCIETY
2020
(2020),
https://automatingsociety.algorithmwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Automating-SocietyReport-2020.pdf (detailing the public sector use of automated decision-making across EU member
states).
72. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1164–65 (2017).
73. De-Arteaga et al., supra note 45; see also René F. Kizilcec, How Much Information? Effects
of Transparency on Trust in an Algorithmic Interface, CHI ’16: PROC. 2016 CHI CONF. ON HUM.
FACTORS
IN
COMPUTING
SYS.
2390–95
(May
7,
2016),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2858036.2858402 (finding that perceived accuracy of ADS can
depend on whether explanations of how the ADS work are easily understood).
74. De-Arteaga et al., supra note 45.
75. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Extreme
Poverty and Human Rights, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/74/493 (Oct. 11, 2019) (describing how significantly
error-ridden Canadian ADS led caseworkers to take measures to undermine its outcomes to ensure
beneficiaries were treated fairly, but this subterfuge made decisions harder to understand).
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government actor’s autonomy is affected by their lack of experience with the
task, high workloads that necessitate multitasking, or overconfidence in the
ADS because of its perceived superiority.76 Both of these problems degrade
ADS-related outcomes, but understanding their origins can also inform
policy mechanisms for mitigating ADS risk and concerns.77 Thus, it is
important to understand the exact role ADS have in governance to effectively
evaluate their use along with relevant laws and regulations.
Third, the definitions clarify what operational actions or functions ADS
perform without relying on technical language. This is expressed as
“predicting, scoring, analyzing, classifying, demarcating, recommending,
allocating, listing, ranking, tracking, mapping, optimizing, imputing,
inferring, labeling, identifying, clustering, excluding, simulating, modeling,
assessing, merging, processing, aggregating, and/or calculating” in the
comprehensive definition and “[a]utomated [d]ecisions [s]ystems can
involve predicting, classifying, optimizing, identifying, and/or
recommending” in the narrow definition. Prevailing ADS definitions often
list the mathematical or computational models and techniques that undergird
ADS, rather than clarify the operational actions or functions those models
enable.78 Yet, this approach continues a problematic tendency of assuming
greater public knowledge and comprehension of the underlying logics of each
model and their respective theoretical weaknesses.79
Relegating the task of determining an accurate understanding of
different models, their inherent weaknesses, and potential consequences
when operationalized in a specific government context to various audiences
with different technical competencies means that important aspects of ADS
design, use, and risks often go unappreciated or are consistently underevaluated.80 This is, in part, because various actors (e.g., the public,
76. Kate Goddard, Abdul Roudsari & Jeremy C. Wyatt, Automation Bias: A Systematic Review
of Frequency, Effect Mediators, and Mitigators, 19 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 121, 124
(2011).
77. See, e.g., Linda J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better Than
Individuals?, 10 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCH. 85 (2000) (finding explicit training about automation
bias can guard against the phenomenon); De-Arteaga et al., supra note 45 (noting that social
accountability mechanisms like high public visibility or ensuring government actors using ADS are
publicly elected can guard against these problems).
78. See supra note 11.
79. Mathematical formulas and models are theoretical so they will produce errors when used in
dynamic, real-world circumstances. Additionally, there are no conventional standards for accuracy,
so error thresholds can vary greatly and are partial to developer choices. See GANDY, JR., supra
note 16, at 20–25.
80. Cf. Hao-Fei Cheng et al., Explaining Decision-Making Algorithms through UI: Strategies
to Help Non-Expert Stakeholders, CHI ’19: PROC. 2019 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYS. (2019), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3290605.3300789 (observing that
improved understanding of ADS logic did not increase participant’s trust in ADS making high-
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government agencies, judges) with different technical competencies are
responsible for having an accurate understanding of different ADS models,
their inherent weaknesses, and their potential consequences in a variety of
governmental contexts. For instance, many ADS employ computational
models that impose correlational analyses on causal decision-making
processes, though there is limited scientific support for this approach.81
Whereas most individuals can comprehend the potential problems that may
arise if an ADS is merely listing information when it should be ranking for
example, the different types of errors and misinterpretations that stem from
more subtle inappropriate applications may not be evident when technical
language is used. Model selection often reflects “the interests, background,
and goals of the modelers or their clients” and these choices should be visible
to or at least weighted against the goals and interests of the different
stakeholders using or affected by ADS—i.e., how much error is socially or
politically acceptable and how the impact of such errors are distributed in
society.82 But, this is less likely to happen if most relevant actors do not
understand what ADS are doing, so it is the work of definitions to help
translate these operational actions and functions.
Finally, the definitions acknowledge and name impact. This is
expressed as “[a]utomated decision systems impact opportunities, access,
liberties, safety, rights, needs, behavior, residence, and/or status” in the
comprehensive definition and “impact opportunities, access, liberties, rights,
and/or safety” in the narrow definition. A primary concern with ADS is that
they produce unintended, negative outcomes that reproduce and worsen
existing structural inequalities. Yet, these impacts may not be readily
apparent or identifiable by those empowered to detect and address them,
namely developers of ADS and government actors using ADS or enforcing
ADS regulations.83

stakes decisions). See also Rechtbank Den Haag [Court of the Hague] 5 februari 2020, Case No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388, m.nt. (NJCM/the Netherlands) para. 6.49 (Neth.) (finding the Dutch
law regulating a fraud detection ADS did not clarify how the decision model functions and thus
inhibited the Court’s ability “assess the correctness of the position of the State of the precise nature
of” the ADS).
81. Cf. Sendhil Mullainathan & Jann Spiess, Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric
Approach, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 87 (2017) (describing concerns and problems that arise from
applying machine learning naively or to inappropriate tasks); Obermeyer et al., supra note 3 (finding
a hospital algorithm produced racially biased results by inferring a correlational relationship in data
was causal).
82. GANDY, JR., supra note 16, at 20–25.
83. Alston, supra note 75, at 14–15 (highlighting social welfare ADS that were implemented
without ensuring legality).
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There are several drivers of this problem, but two related sources are
relevant for ADS definitions and regulations.84 The first is that ADS
developers often lack sufficient understanding of the relevant sector where
their technology will be used and the problems they seek to address, so they
fail to fully appreciate and understand the risks and errors associated with
their design choices and fail to anticipate negative outcomes.85 The second
is that government actors seeking to use ADS or enforce relevant ADS
regulations often overestimate the ability of ADS to solve complex social
problems and fail to assess the full social costs and risks associated with ADS
use, whether it is ignoring the role of government practices and policies in
contributing to the problem ADS seek to address or developers failing to
disclose known risks or vulnerabilities.86 These problems are related because
they both demonstrate how information germane to our understanding of
ADS’ impacts can be overlooked, withheld, misconstrued, and distorted by
84. See, e.g., RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE
NEW JIM CODE (2019) (positing that racial inequities are deepening due to discrimination encoded
in and amplified through data-driven technologies); ROBERT N. PROCTOR, VALUE-FREE SCIENCE?
PURITY AND POWER IN MODERN KNOWLEDGE (1991) (describing how the construct of scientific
neutrality advanced as a resolution of social conflict and to serve certain interests); DOROTHY
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (describing how biologically racist logic persists and
promotes racial inequality); TUKUFU ZUBERI & EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE LOGIC, WHITE
METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY (2008) (detailing how white methods and white logic
shape the production of racial knowledge).
85. See generally Ben Green, “Good” Isn’t Good Enough, AI FOR SOC. GOOD WORKSHOP at
NeurIPS (2019) (describing common oversights and naivete exhibited by computer scientists
developing ADS for sensitive social issues); Ben Green, The False Promise of Risk Assessments:
Epistemic Reform and the Limits of Fairness, FAT* ’20: PROC. 2020 CONF. ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, & TRANSPARENCY (2020) (detailing epistemic flaws and oversights in
designing risk assessments); Roel Dobbe, Thomas Krendl Gilbert & Yonatan Mintz, Hard Choices
in
Artificial
Intelligence,
A.I.
(Nov.
2021),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370221001065
(analyzing normative
choices made in the ADS design process that are not appreciated by developers and the public);
Darshali A. Vyas, Leo G. Eisenstein & David S. Jones, Hidden in Plain Sight — Reconsidering the
Use of Race Correction in Clinical Algorithms, 383 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 874 (2020)
(highlighting how clinical algorithms employ race correction mechanisms that may worsen racial
health disparities while ignoring outdated and racist rationales for including the correction). See
also Michael D. Cobb & Jane Macoubrie, Public Perceptions About Nanotechnology: Risks,
Benefits and Trust, 6 J. NANOPARTICLE RSCH. 395 (2004) (finding low public trust in technology
business leaders to protect the public from potential risks of nanotechnology).
86. GANDY, JR., supra note 16, at 55–76, 146–61. See generally Rashida Richardson, Jason
M. Schultz & Kate Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15 (2019)
(highlighting how some police departments use predictive policing technologies to address bias
while ignoring that their current and historical discriminatory police practices and policies may
skew the outcomes produced by the technology); Ajunwa, supra note 61 (arguing that bias
introduced in the hiring process and employment law’s deference to employers are not overcome
by the use of algorithmic hiring).

2022]DEFINING AND DEMYSTIFYING AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS 805
the primary actors expected to identify and mitigate ADS-related problems
and harms.87 Since ADS’ impacts may not be self-evident, they must be
named as a way to provide guidance and accountability.88
II. APPLYING THE DEFINITIONS TO REAL-WORLD USE CASES
This Part analyzes the history and practical implementation of two ADS
currently used by government agencies: teacher evaluation systems and gang
databases. These use cases were chosen because they represent urgent
domains for ADS regulation and emphasize the variegated policy uses of
ADS in vulnerable public domains. For each use case, I evaluate the social
and political conditions that engendered the development of these particular
ADS because this context is crucial to understanding how they aid
governance as well as evaluating the risks, benefits, and impact of the ADS
on society and relevant government institutions. This analysis is coupled
with an examination of the practical realities of ADS implementation to
demonstrate how social policy can precede and prefigure ADS design and
implementation.89 I then break down the narrow definition into its key
components and demonstrate how each ADS meets this definition and how
the definitions can enhance ADS laws and regulations. Since the narrow and
comprehensive definitions are concentric, I apply these use cases to the
narrow definition because it allows for a compendious review.
A. Teacher Evaluation Systems
1. Background
Teacher evaluation systems90 are used by school and other government
officials to inform or make employment decisions (e.g., rewards, promotions,
87. GANDY, JR., supra note 16, at 146–61 (discussing the role of information in technology and
social policy formulation and evaluation).
88. While the role of data is a common topic in ADS scholarship, it is not a necessary
component for ADS’ legislative and regulatory definitions. Legal and normative inquiries regarding
the role of data in ADS design, use, and outcomes are warranted and should be performed in a
sector- or context-specific manner. This can be established or incentivized in the normative
provisions of any proposed ADS legislation or regulation.
89. See Steven J. Jackson, Tarleton Gillespie & Sandy Payette, The Policy Knot: Re-integrating
Policy, Practice and Design in CSCW Studies of Social Computing, PROC. 2017 ACM CONF. ON
COMPUT. SUPPORTED COOP. WORK & SOC. COMPUTING (2014) (arguing for more scholarship that
interrogates how policy is entangled with ADS design and practice).
90. Here and throughout this Article, I use the term teacher evaluation systems to refer to
digitized and automated systems of evaluation that were created in response to federal education
policies. Conventional teacher evaluations are conducted by principals or other school
administrators and can include classroom observations, reviews of lesson plans and records, and
student or parent feedback.
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termination, disciplinary actions), to evaluate teacher performance, and to
implement local, state, or federal education policies. These systems can exist
in many forms, but this Article focuses on teacher evaluation systems that are
designed to measure teacher performance or contributions to student learning
based, at least in part, on large-scale standardized achievement tests.
Teacher evaluation systems came into prominence in the United States
following several seismic shifts in federal education policy. In 1983, the
National Commission on Education released A Nation at Risk, a United States
Department of Education (“DOE”)-commissioned report that examined the
quality of education in the United States.91 The report suggested that the
United States was losing its competitiveness with other industrialized nations
because of poorly performing public schools, and though the report’s claims
were subsequently proven to be erroneous and exaggerated, it nonetheless
changed policymakers’ and the public’s views on the American public school
system and provoked an accountability movement in education.92 Yet, this
move towards greater accountability in public education tended to “impose a
uniform grid [e.g., homogenized curricula, large-scale standardized testing,
rigorous standards for students, educators, and administrators] on diverse
circumstances and parental and student cultures without recognizing that
local conditions may demand different strategies in implementing
changes.”93
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”) represented a major
shift in education policy reform towards increased accountability.94 NCLB
used federal funding to pressure schools to improve student proficiency
through annual standardized tests and created harsh penalties for
noncompliance. Because NCLB did this without creating a national standard,
states had flexibility in the selection of tests, standards, evaluation systems
and compliance policies, as long as schools were improving.95 As a result,
91. NAT’L COMM. ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
92. DAVID C. BERLINER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS: MYTHS, FRAUD,
AND THE ATTACK ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1995) (critiquing the findings of A Nation at
Risk as creating a manufactured crisis about the American education system that failed to address
the real challenges American educators face); see also AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 9–
10 (2014) (describing the A Nation at Risk report as an impetus for the education accountability
movement).
93. TENNER, supra note 49, at 101.
94. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
95. Prior to NCLB, education equity and adequacy were primarily promoted and upheld using
the state and federal equal protection claims or state education statutes. Teacher quality was
performed using classroom observations and salary and employment decisions followed a fixed
salary schedule that rewarded experience and credentials. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 458 U.S. 457 (1981) (holding that a state initiative preventing districts from enforcing mandatory
busing violated the Equal Protection Clause because it primarily disadvantaged minority students);
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many states tied school funding, closures, and teacher and administrator
performance evaluations to student test performance,96 while data analytics
companies began lobbying the federal government to use their automated
software systems to measure teacher, school, district, and state
performance.97
Yet another shift occurred just seven years later. In 2009, DOE created
a $4.35 billion competition grant, Race to the Top (“RttT”), to incentivize
states to adopt common standards, implement performance-based
evaluations for teachers and principals, turn around low performing schools,
and employ consequential uses of data systems. RttT represented two major
shifts in education policy: (1) it moved away from NCLB’s focus of holding
students accountable for meeting higher standards to holding teachers and
administrators accountable for student achievement;98 and (2) it diverted
government money to private enterprise, rather than investing directly in
students, teachers, and local communities.99 However, RttT did not include

Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that the state’s education clause required
the legislature to enact a school funding system that was fair and equitable); Mills v. Bd. of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding that the district’s exclusionary practices violated the Equal
Protection Clause and ordering a school district to provide equal access to education for students
with disabilities); SEAN P. CORCORAN, CAN TEACHERS BE EVALUATED BY THEIR STUDENTS’
TEST SCORES? SHOULD THEY BE? THE USE OF VALUE-ADDED MEASURES OF TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2010) (describing teacher quality assessments
before NCLB).
96. Helen F. Ladd, No Child Left Behind: A Deeply Flawed Federal Policy, 36 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 461, 464 (2017) (finding NCLB’s use of “top-down accountability pressure”
was a more punitive than constructive approach to education reform); Derek Neal & Diane
Whitmore Schanzenbach, Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based
Accountability, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 263 (2010) (concluding that stringent proficiency policies
led teachers to shift more attention to students near current proficiency standards).
97. See, e.g., Issues Lobbied by SAS Institute, 2002, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/federallobbying/clients/issues?cycle=2002&id=D000037384&spec=EDU&specific_issue=Education#sp
ecific_issue (last visited Feb. 13, 2022) (“Discussed implementation and administration of
accountability and Adequate Yearly Progress as it relates to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
Public Law 107-110, to close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice.”).
98. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 19; Bruce D. Baker, Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston
C. Green, The Legal Consequences of Mandating High Stakes Decisions Based on Low Quality
Information: Teacher Evaluation in the Race-to-the-Top Era, EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES,
(Jan. 28, 2013), https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/index.php/epaa/article/view/1298/1043 (summarizing
various state laws that require use of student performance data for teacher evaluations).
99. Diane Ravitch, Education Law Center: States with Most Unequal Funding Won RTTT
Grants, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG (Apr. 10, 2014), https://dianeravitch.net/2014/04/10/educationlaw-center-states-with-most-unequal-funding-won-rttt-grants/ (describing research that found
states that won largest share of RttT grants had the least fair and equitable state school finance
systems); Mike Simpson, Latest Race to the Top Grants Go To States at Bottom on School Funding
Equity,
BIG
EDUC.
APE
BLOG
(Dec.
18,
2012,
11:04
AM),
http://bigeducationape.blogspot.com/2013/01/education-justice-december-18-2012.html (finding
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explicit guidance on how to implement its policy principles, so many states
turned to evaluation systems that linked teacher performance to their
students’ test scores, resulting in forty states and the District of Columbia
using, piloting, or developing such systems by 2014.100 Despite the
enactment of the Every Student Succeeds Act (“ESSA”) in 2015, which
reduced federal incentives and enforcement of test-based teacher
accountability, state and school district reliance on teacher evaluation
systems persists due to the preceding decade of financial and public policy
investment to develop or acquire such systems.101
2. Teacher Evaluation Systems in Practice
The most common teacher evaluation system is the Value-Added Model
(“VAM”),102 and the most common proprietary version of this model is the
Education Value-Added Assessment Systems (“EVAAS”).103 VAMs are
multivariate statistical tools that attempt to measure and classify the
purported effect of an individual teacher on student performance on largescale standardized achievement tests in certain subject areas over time.
VAMs measure a group of students’ academic progress using either a
predictive model that predicts the average student gains expected and then
compares with the actual average gains, or a comparative model that uses a
prior or pre-test score to represent student proficiency when they enter the

the “RTTT grant process ignores the key precondition for sustaining any meaningful education
reform – a fair and equitable state school finance system”).
100. Clarin Collins & Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Putting Growth and Value-Added Models on
the
Map:
A
National
Overview,
TCHRS.
COLL.
REC.
(2014),
https://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentId=17291; KEVIN CLOSE, AUDREY AMREINBEARDSLEY & CLARIN COLLINS, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CTR., STATE-LEVEL ASSESSMENTS AND
TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEMS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT:
SOME STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 8 (2018); Mark A. Paige, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley &
Kevin Close, Tennessee’s National Impact on Teacher Evaluation Law & Policy: An Assessment of
Value-Added Model Litigation, 13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 523, 534–35 (2019).
101. Kevin Close, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Clarin Collins, Putting Teacher Evaluation
Systems on the Map: An Overview of States’ Teacher Evaluation Systems Post–Every Student
Succeeds
Act,
EDUC.
POL’Y
ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES
(Apr.
13,
2020),
https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/index.php/epaa/article/view/5252/2423.
102. Student Growth Percentiles (“SGPs”) are another common teacher evaluation system.
Unlike VAM models, SGPs do not use statistical controls or attribute responsibility for student
performance to the teacher or school. SGPs measure the relative change in a student’s performance
as compared to similarly situated students. Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, VAMs v. Student Growth
Percentiles (SGPs) — Part II, VAMBOOZLED! (Dec. 3, 2013), http://vamboozled.com/vams-vstudent-growth-percentiles-sgps-part-ii/; Bruce D. Baker, Firing Teachers Based on Bad (VAM)
Versus Wrong (SGP) Measures of Effectiveness: Legal Note, SCH. FIN. 101 BLOG (Mar. 31, 2012),
https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2012/03/31/firing-teachers-based-on-bad-vam-versuswrong-sgp-measures-of-effectiveness-legal-note/.
103. Close et al., supra note 101, at 6.
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teacher’s classroom and then compares with subsequent test scores.104 Most
models control for at least one year of student prior test scores and some
models105 control for external variables (e.g., student background and
classroom or school characteristics),106 but the outcomes of these calculations
are used to make inferences about the teacher’s effectiveness or impact on
student learning and progress.107 If there is a positive difference (typically
one standard deviation above zero), then the teacher is considered effective
or having added value to student achievement, and if there is a negative
difference (typically below one standard deviation below zero), then the
teacher is considered ineffective.108 The calculations and inferences are then
used to make relativistic comparisons of all teachers in a school or school
district to create a continuum of high to low value-added classifications.109
These outcomes are used to implement teacher accountability policy and
thus inform high-stakes employment decisions including but not limited to
teacher tenure, compensation, merit pay, disciplinary action, termination, and
professional development.110 Reliance on VAM outcomes for such
consequential decisions was incentivized by federal and state policy
requirements.111 For example, Florida “amended [its] teacher evaluation
statutes to ensure that VAMs played a controlling role in teacher employment
status, including tenure decisions.”112 Additionally, due to automation bias,
104. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 21–23.
105. EVAAS is “the only large-scale VAM that intentionally excludes statistical controls for
student risk variables.” Id. at 58. Student risk variables can include student background variables
like race, socioeconomic status, levels of English language proficiency, and special education status.
Id.
106. Kimberly Kappler Hewitt, Educator Evaluation Policy that Incorporates EVAAS ValueAdded Measures: Undermined Intentions and Exacerbated Inequities, 23 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES 21–23 (Aug. 10, 2015), https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/index.php/epaa/article/view/1968/1642
(describing how various external variables affect or bias value-added calculations).
107. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 21–23.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Baker et al., supra note 98, at 304; Stephanie Banchero & David Kesmodel, Teachers Are
Put to the Test: More States Tie Tenure, Bonuses to New Formulas for Measuring Test Scores,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Sept.
13,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903895904576544523666669018; Close et al.,
supra note 101, at 6.
111. Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y Educ., Remarks at The Race to the Top Program Announcement:
The Race to the Top Begins (July 24, 2009) (on file with Dep’t of Educ.) (“We have $200 million
in Recovery Act funding for the Teacher Incentive Fund, which supports performance-based teacher
and principal compensation systems in high-need schools.”); Baker et al., supra note 98; Close et
al., supra note 101, at 5–6 (describing how the federal government required states to adopt rigid
accountability practices for teacher evaluations and employment matters to secure waivers from
NCLB non-compliance penalties).
112. Paige et al., supra note 100, at 528 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.22(1)(c)(5) (West
2013)) (connecting teacher salary to an evaluation system that requires use of VAMs).
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VAM outcomes can have undue influence on school administrators’
decision-making and there is evidence that school administrators have altered
other teacher evaluation indicators to match VAM outcomes or justify
controversial decisions.113
Despite the prevalence of VAMs, their use, especially for consequential
decisions, is heavily criticized and the subject of at least fifteen lawsuits
across seven states.114 VAMs are criticized for being unreliable, invalid,
biased, unfair, and opaque, and for producing perverse outcomes. VAMs are
criticized as unreliable because they have large error ranges that vary from
year to year such that “teachers classified as ‘effective’ one year will have a
25%–59% chance of being classified as ‘ineffective’ the next year, or vice
versa.”115 Since VAM outcomes are inconsistent and unreliable, they are also
considered invalid because they cannot support accurate interpretations of
and inferences about teachers’ causal effects on student achievement, and
there is limited research to support claims of VAM validity.116 VAMs are
considered biased because there are several variables and characteristics of
the educational environment that are unpredictable, unobservable, or beyond
the control of a teacher or school, and therefore cannot be controlled in a way
that mitigates biased outcomes, even with the most sophisticated statistical
methods.117 Additionally, bias may not present in obvious patterns across a
dataset, so for many VAMs it remains unclear if the models are measuring a
teacher’s effect on student achievement or the effect of something else on
student achievement.118 VAMs are considered unfair119 for several reasons
but a chief criticism is that VAM-based estimates, particularly EVAAS, can
113. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 45; CORCORAN, supra note 95, at 8.
114. Close et al., supra note 101, at 7; Stephen Sawchuk, Teacher Evaluation Heads to the
Courts, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/teacherevaluation-heads-to-the-courts.html.
115. Close et al., supra note 101, at 7; see also AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 33–35.
116. See AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 35–37; Kappler Hewitt, supra note 106; see
also Lederman v. King, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838, 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (finding government reliance
on VAM for teacher evaluations was arbitrary and irrational thus supporting claims of VAM
invalidity).
117. Such variables or characteristics can include but are not limited to students’ home lives and
family situations, modifications, disruptions, non-random student classroom assignments, and
missing data. See, e.g., AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 38–41; Jesse Rothstein, Student
Sorting and Bias in Value-Added Estimation: Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 4
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 537, 565 (2009); Kappler Hewitt, supra note 106.
118. Baker et al., supra note 98, at 16.
119. See, e.g., Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Without a doubt, the
evaluation scheme has led to some unfair results . . . .”); Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1215
(N.D. Fla. 2014) (“The unfairness of the evaluation system as implemented is not lost on this Court.
We have a teacher evaluation system in Florida that is supposed to measure the individual
effectiveness of each teacher. But as the Plaintiffs have shown, the standards for evaluation differ
significantly.”)
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only be produced for approximately 30–40% of all public school teachers
who teach core subject areas tested120 using large-scale standardized tests.121
VAMs are not transparent because VAM outcomes are often not understood
or useful for formative purposes to those receiving the results,122 and vendors
of proprietary VAMs are resistant to inspection.123 Finally, use of VAMs,
especially for consequential decisions, can lead to perverse outcomes like
teaching to the test, teacher retention issues, or avoiding high-need students
and schools.124
3. Applying Teacher Evaluations Systems to the Narrow Definition
Despite critical scholarship and litigation challenging their use and
formative value, teacher evaluation systems continue to play an important
role in education decision-making and policy implementation.125 This is
because their use, negative impacts, and overall qualitative and quantitative
futility126 remain invisible to and misunderstood by federal education
policymakers and the public.127 Because the definitions help bring clarity

120. Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, supra note 100 (“100% of the states currently calculating (or
with plans to calculate) these data are using (or are planning to use) their large-scale, state-level,
standardized test score data, predominantly collected in grades 4–8 in the core subject areas of
mathematics and English/language arts.”).
121. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 41–42; Preston C. Green, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph
Oluwole, The Legal and Policy Implication of Value-Added Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 14–15 (2012).
122. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 42–44; Rachael Gabriel & Jessica Nina Lester,
Sentinels Guarding the Grail: Value-Added Measurement and the Quest for Education Reform,
EDUC.
POL’Y
ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES
(Jan.
31,
2013),
https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/index.php/epaa/article/view/1165/1045.
123. LITIGATING ALGORITHMS, supra note 38, at 10 (“When [Houston Federation of Teachers]
members asked to examine the systems, they were denied with the explanation that the algorithms
and code that comprised these systems were the private property of a third-party vendor.”); Hous.
Fed’n Tchrs., Loc. 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (denying
school district’s motion for summary judgment on procedural due process claims, while leaving
trade secrets claims intact).
124. Susan Moore Johnson, Will VAMS Reinforce the Walls of the Egg-Crate School?, 44 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 117, 120–22 (2015); Kappler Hewitt, supra note 106, at 24–29; Close et al., supra
note 101, at 5.
125. Close et al., supra note 101, at 20.
126. Qualitative and quantitative futility are terms used in the medical field to categorize
treatments or procedures that have an unreasonably low percentage chance of achieving a desired
goal (quantitative futility) or where the quality of benefit a particular intervention will produce is
exceedingly poor (qualitative futility). Here, I extend these terms to teacher evaluation systems and
ADS more generally to demonstrate their shared deficiencies in achieving desired goals or
outcomes.
127. Cf. Close et al., supra note 101 (describing how practitioners and state education officials
are shifting away from quantitative test score teacher evaluation systems towards research-based
conceptual frameworks with greater local control).
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and visibility to the actions performed by teacher evaluation systems, their
integral role in governance, and their impacts, the definitions can instigate
greater scrutiny regarding their use and urgency for reform. This Section
demonstrates how teacher evaluation systems meet our narrow definition,
and how policymakers within the education sector should evaluate each
component of the definition.
(a) “Any systems, software, or processes that use computation”
In the United States, some states or school districts developed and
implemented their own teacher evaluation system. Some are computed using
publicly available software,128 while others turn to one of the eight third-party
proprietary software systems.129
Most VAMs use regression analysis to compute the value added at the
teacher and school level.130 Other teacher evaluation systems, like Student
Growth Percentiles, apply similar statistical models to compute performance
metrics and evaluate teachers.131
(b) “to aid or replace government decisions, judgments, and/or
policy implementation”
Teacher evaluation systems are used to measure teacher effectiveness,
implement state or federal education policy, and make employment-related
decisions.132 Most teacher evaluation systems are a byproduct of federal
education policy that incentivized their use and state education laws, which
in most cases prescribe how teacher evaluation systems should be used or
accounted for in decision-making. School and other government officials
128. See, e.g., Elias Walsh & Eric Isenberg, How Does a Value-Added Model Compare to the
Colorado Growth Model? 2 (Mathematica Pol’y Rsch., Working Paper No. 22, 2013)
(“Policymakers may also prefer the [Colorado Growth Model] because student growth percentiles
can be computed with publicly available software that does not require extensive customization for
use by a state or district.”).
129. See Close et al., supra note 101, at 6 (“The most common proprietary model was the
Education Value-Added Assessment System, with five states adopting it statewide (i.e., North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee)” (citations omitted)); Banchero &
Kesmodel, supra note 110 (“Rob Meyer, the bowtie-wearing economist who runs the Value-Added
Research Center, known as VARC . . . calls his statistical model a ‘well-crafted recipe.’ VARC is
one of at least eight entities developing such models.”)
130. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 22; Banchero & Kesmodel, supra note 110.
131. Colorado Growth Model FAQs (General), COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.cde.state.co.us/schoolview/generalgrowthmodelfaq#q22 (last updated Dec. 14, 2016)
(“The Colorado Growth Model is a statistical model to calculate each student’s progress on state
assessments.”); The Use of Multiple Years of Data to Calculate Median Student Growth Percentiles,
N.J.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.state.nj.us/education/AchieveNJ/teacher/MultiyearSGPOverview.pdf.
132. See supra Section II.A.1.
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then use the teacher evaluation system outcomes to aid employment-related
decisions for teachers. Some state education laws mandate that teacher
evaluation system outcomes are a sole or significant factor in making
employment-related decisions for teachers,133 some state laws dictate what
types of decisions teacher evaluation system results can be used,134 and some
states or jurisdictions lack specific statutory stipulations but there is
evidence135 that teacher evaluation systems aided high stakes decisions.136
(c) “that impact opportunities, access, liberties, rights, and/or
safety”
Teacher evaluation systems impact teachers’ opportunities, rights, and
liberties. Teachers’ access to employment opportunities is impacted because
teacher evaluation system results are used to make employment decisions like
tenure and reassignment. The results of teacher evaluation systems remain
on teachers’ permanent professional files, which can prevent or inhibit a
teacher’s ability to change jobs within a state, or result in designations that
hinder job mobility and options.137 Reliance on teacher evaluation systems
for such high-stakes employment decisions also affects student opportunities
because their use can lead to perverse outcomes like teachers avoiding highneed students, classrooms, and schools that are more likely to hinder positive
evaluation results or principals “‘stacking’ classes to make sure certain

133. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:442 (2018); S.B. 10-191, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2010).
134. In 2008, New York passed a law that prohibited school districts from tying teacher tenure
decisions to student test scores, which includes the use of teacher evaluation systems. Since
guidelines for RttT funding penalized such laws and New York State lost its first bid for the federal
grant program, the New York State Department of Education and the teachers’ unions subsequently
entered an agreement that linked 40% of a teacher’s performance evaluation to student performance
measures. Early research following this agreement found that principals changed their evaluations
of teachers in response to negative VAM results, and a higher fraction of teachers receiving low
VAM results were denied tenure following this policy change. CORCORAN, supra note 95, at 6–9.
135. Thomas Dee & James Wyckoff, Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence
from IMPACT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19529, 2013) (finding evidence that
teacher evaluation, including VAM results, were used in teacher dismissal decisions and VAM data
accounted for 50% of teacher evaluations despite no statutory stipulations).
136. Baker et al., supra note 98; Close et al., supra note 101, at 11; Collins & Amrein-Beardsley,
supra note 100, at 1–2.
137. Paige et al., supra note 100, at 533; MARK A. PAIGE, BUILDING A BETTER TEACHER:
UNDERSTANDING VALUE-ADDED MODELS IN THE LAW OF TEACHER EVALUATION 15, 16 (2016)
(warning against use of teacher evaluation systems for high-stakes decisions); Marcus A. Winters,
The Fight over Flunked-Out Teachers, CITY J., Winter 2018, https://www.cityjournal.org/html/fight-over-flunked-out-teachers-15661.html
(describing
the
negative
consequences of being included on the Absent Teacher Reserve list used in New York City, and
where 12% of the list is comprised of teachers with ineffective performance ratings).
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teachers can demonstrate value added or growth or vice versa.”138 These
types of perverse outcomes significantly impact the type of education
students receive, their overall educational trajectory, and life chances.
Teacher evaluation systems impact teachers’ rights and liberties because
overreliance on such systems implicates teachers’ due process rights139 and
engenders arbitrary decision-making that impedes a teacher’s access to
certain rights, benefits, or privileges, such as salary increases and merit
pay.140 Reliance on flawed teacher evaluation systems can also produce
racially biased outcomes in teacher employment decisions because these
systems can “classify teachers of certain races as failing not because of their
actual effectiveness but because of the students they were more likely to have
served.”141 Even though fewer than one in ten teachers in U.S. public schools
are non-white, these teachers tend to work in lower-resourced, high-need
schools,142 where teacher evaluation systems are less precise because the
students in these environments have “‘harder-to-predict’ achievement.”143 In
these circumstances, non-white teachers are systemically disadvantaged and
it is possible that their civil rights are violated, particularly under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.144

138. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 24; see also Kappler Hewitt, supra note 106, at 24–
29 (describing negative consequence produced by reliance on teacher evaluation systems as
predicted and observed by educators).
139. Hous. Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc. 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180
(S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding violation of plaintiff’s procedural due process rights); Leff v. Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1242,1246–47 (D. Nev. 2016) (finding that a change to the state laws
governing teaching evaluation and contract status that removed procedural protections and required
use of VAMs did not violate the Constitution’s Contract Clause); Baker et al., supra note 98, at 10
(“[T]here exists significant possibility that where arbitrary distinctions that cannot be made, are
made, that the policies in question violate the due process rights of teachers.”).
140. Banchero & Kesmodel, supra note 110; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION & REG’L
ASSISTANCE, STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR TEACHER EVALUATION POLICIES PROMOTED BY RACE
TO THE TOP (2014) (describing how teacher evaluation systems are used for decision-making,
including performance-based compensation); CORCORAN, supra note 95, at 12–13.
141. Baker et al., supra note 98, at 16.
142. Katherine Schaeffer, America’s Public School Teachers Are Far Less Racially and
Ethnically Diverse than Their Students, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/12/10/americas-public-school-teachers-are-far-lessracially-and-ethnically-diverse-than-their-students/ (describing data on the low racial and ethnic
diversity amongst U.S. public school teachers and how teachers of different races work in different
school environments).
143. AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 168; see also Mariesa Herrmann et al., Shrinkage
of Value-Added Estimates and Characteristics of Student with Hard-to-Predict Achievement Levels
(Mathematica Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 17, 2013) (finding the achievement of particular
groups of students—students with low prior achievement and who receive free lunch—are harder
to predict using VAM teacher evaluation systems)
144. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
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(d) “Automated [d]ecision [s]ystems can involve predicting,
classifying, optimizing, identifying, and/or recommending”
Teacher evaluation systems involve inferences and classification.
Systems like VAMs make inferences about a teacher’s impact on student
achievement by measuring student performance on large-scale standardized
tests. These inferences are then adjusted and aggregated on a continuum to
classify all teachers within a school or district according to the teacher
performance categories (e.g., “effective” or “ineffective”) when stipulated by
state law.145
B. Gang Databases
1. Background
Gang databases are centralized and decentralized information systems
primarily used by criminal justice actors and institutions to compile, analyze,
and disseminate information about gangs and alleged gang members for a
variety of interests and priorities. They have become more common for
national, regional, and local use in recent decades and hold a global
presence,146 but their development and use are determined by jurisdictional
laws, politics, and culture, so this Article focuses on digitized gang databases
in the United States.
Following two Great Migrations of Black communities escaping the
racial terrorism of Jim Crow in southern states and Puerto Ricans seeking
economic opportunities, concern about street gangs became a common
feature in increasingly segregated cities during the 1940s and 1950s, where
groups of young men would engage in turf wars over neighboring ethnic
enclaves.147 In response to rising rates of violent crime in major cities like
New York and Los Angeles associated with growing economic inequality in

(1977) (holding Title VII prohibits racial discrimination and that statistical evidence can be used to
find a prima facie case of race discrimination).
145. See AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 20–25; Baker et al., supra note 98.
146. See, e.g., Ali Winston, You May Be in California’s Gang Database and Not Even Know It,
REVEAL NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/you-may-be-in-californiasgang-database-and-not-even-know-it/ (noting that Canada used GangNet, a web-based gang
database modeled after CalGang and created by SRA International, Inc); James A. Densely & David
C. Pyrooz, The Matrix in Context: Taking Stock of Police Gang Databases in London and Beyond,
20 YOUTH JUST. 11, 11–12 (2020) (describing London’s Gang Matrix gang databases used by the
London Metropolitan Police Services); Betsy Powell, It Works like Gangbusters, TORONTO STAR
(Sept. 27, 2005), https://www.pressreader.com/canada/toronto-star/20050927/281573761084978
(describing the use of GangNet in Canada).
147. RICHARD C. MCCORKLE & TERANCE D. MIETHE, PANIC: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
THE STREET GANG PROBLEM 45–47 (2002).
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the late 1950s and 1960s,148 municipalities created anti-gang units within
local police departments.149 In the mid-1970s, amid deindustrialization150
and a sharp increase in high school expulsion rates and homicides,
particularly amongst young Black and Latinx men, the federal government
declared gang violence and suppression a new focal point151 for federal law
enforcement.152 This new focus also helped fortify the Republican Party’s
embrace of “tough on crime” rhetoric and policies.153 Though some local
police departments were already engaged in gang suppression efforts, more
police departments adopted this federal priority as a result of the Ford
Administration’s deep commitment to and practice of New Federalism,154
where federal block grants are used to induce state adoption of federal

148. Id.; JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, JUST. POL’Y INST., GANG WARS: THE FAILURE OF
ENFORCEMENT TACTIC AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SAFETY STRATEGIES 13–29 (2007),
https://justicepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/07-07_rep_gangwars_gc-psac-jj.pdf; MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND
SOCIETY 154 (2003) (citing Richard Fowels & Mary Merva, Wage Inequality and Criminal Activity:
An Extreme Bounds Analysis for the United States, 1975–1990, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1996))
(describing research that demonstrated that rising crime rates were associated with rising economic
inequality which confirmed strain theories that suggested crime was most likely to grow from
relational socioeconomic inequality).
149. MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 48–50.
150. Deindustrialization is the term used to describe the process and conditions of social and
economic change caused by the decline or removal of industrial activity, particularly manufacturing,
in a country or region. In the United States, deindustrialization conditions include economic
volatility, high and chronic unemployment rates, foreign competition, and suburbanization. See
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR
(1996); IRA KATZNELSON, CITY TRENCHES: URBAN POLITICS AND THE PATTERNING OF CLASS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1981); JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1993); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE
ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996).
151. Before this shift in federal law enforcement priorities, federal agency intelligence efforts
focused on “political radicals and suspected terrorists.” James B. Jacobs, Gang Databases: Context
and Questions, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 705, 706 (2009). “Legal challenges to some of these
operations resulted in tight controls as to when and what kind of intelligence files could be opened
and what use could be made of the information.” Id.
152. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 263–70 (2016).
153. BROWN ET AL., supra note 148, at 153–60 (detailing the fallacies of conservative
explanations of crime and embrace of “tough on crime” rhetoric and policies).
154. New Federalism is a political ideology practiced by most U.S. presidential administrations
since President Richard Nixon. It is an approach that attempts to advance a domestic affairs agenda
by sharing priorities and power between the federal government and states, while upholding
constitutional principles. The most notable applications of New Federalism are the federal
government’s efforts to advance school desegregation and urban renewal. See Neal Devins & James
B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation
Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243 (1984); Bruce Katz, Nixon’s New Federalism 45 Years Later,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Aug.
11,
2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2014/08/11/nixons-new-federalism-45-years-later/.
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priorities (often racially motivated objectives) while still operating within a
states’ rights paradigm.155 This marked a notable shift because law
enforcement in the United States is highly decentralized, but during this time
period a number of national commissions and police leaders pushed for
consolidation that never fully materialized but resulted in more complex
interagency cooperation, especially for organized crime efforts.156
In 1987, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the Law
Enforcement Communications Network157 launched the Gang Reporting,
Evaluation, and Tracking System (“GREAT”), a decentralized intelligence
database for law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, prosecutors, and
probation) to identify and investigate street gangs and their members, a first
of its kind.158 In 1993, the California Department of Justice (“Cal DOJ”)
expressed interest in centralizing and upgrading GREAT, then initiated
consultancies with external vendors to develop an improved system.159 In
1995, Cal DOJ contracted with the private software firm Orion Scientific
Systems Inc. to create a prototype of a new unified statewide gang database
system to be piloted with the San Diego Police Department.160 That same
year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File—a database with information on gang and terrorist
activity—became operational,161 and nationally the use of automated systems
for storing gang information became more common in police departments
155. HINTON, supra note 152, at 263–70. Contemporary research on law enforcement anti-gang
efforts have demonstrated that this New Federalism approach to local gang issues has created a
perverse feedback loop, where local police departments have inflated gang statistics to obtain
federal funds. See, e.g, Marjorie Zatz, Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of a Moral
Panic, 11 CONTEMP. CRISES 129, 129–34 (1987) (noting that the Phoenix Police Department
inflated estimates of gangs from five to more than one hundred in a two-year period in order to
attract more federal funding).
156. Jacobs, supra note 151, at 707–08; Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police
Organization Continuity and Change: Into the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55, 59–62
(2010).
157. The Law Enforcement Communication Network is a private, non-profit law enforcement
organization. Stacey Leyton, The New Blacklists: The Threat to Civil Liberties Posed by Gang
Databases, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 109, 144 n.20
(Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., 2003).
158. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, URBAN STREET GANG
ENFORCEMENT 29 (1997); Leyton, supra note 157, at 111; CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISITION PROJECT CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CAL/GANG SYSTEM
1 (undated) (draft report) (on file with author).
159. Cal DOJ initially engaged a computer consultant using a $300,000 grant from the California
Office of Criminal Justice Planning to expand GREAT, but after seeing few results by 1995, Cal
DOJ severed ties with the consultant. Later that year, Cal DOJ was introduced to Orion Scientific
Systems and requested the firm make a proposal to address their problems with GREAT. CAL.
DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 158, at 2–3.
160. Id. at 3–4.
161. Leyton, supra note 157, at 113.
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and prosecutors’ offices.162 In 1997, the expansion of interagency gang
databases continued with President Clinton announcing the launch of the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”)-supported National Gang Tracking
Network,163 and then California Governor Pete Wilson announced plans to
spend $800,000 to create CalGang, a fully integrated web-based intranet gang
database system that would be accessible to police departments statewide and
include new capabilities like automated analysis, report generation, and
photographic lineups.164 During this same period, the DOJ’s Bureau of
Justice Assistance (“DOJ BJA”) created RISSGang, a national network of six
regional databases with analytics capabilities to track and support
investigations of gang activity, terrorism, and drug trafficking.165
Gang databases faced several legal challenges as they became more
prevalent on national and local levels. Controversy erupted in Chicago when
the Chicago Police Department was barred from joining the statewide gang
database and from developing its own intelligence systems because of a
consent decree imposed in response to its unlawful practices targeting
political activist and community organizations.166 Then, in City of Chicago
v. Morales,167 the Supreme Court struck down Chicago’s anti-gang loitering
ordinance for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was unconstitutionally vague and provided too much discretion to
law enforcement to decide what constitutes loitering.168 However, the
Morales decision ultimately led law enforcement to rely further on gang

162.
In their study of 149 police departments and 191 prosecutors’ offices across the nation,
Johnson, Webster, Connors, and Saenz (1995) found that 70% of police departments and
20% of prosecutors’ offices used an automated system for storing gang information.
Additionally, of the police departments that reported a gang problem, 78% used a
database.
Julie Barrows & C. Ronald Huff, Gangs and Public Policy: Constructing and Deconstructing Gang
Databases, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 675, 683 (2009) (citing CLAIRE JOHNSON ET AL., Gang
Enforcement Problems and Strategies: National Survey Findings, J. GANG RSCH., Fall 1995, at 1;
see also IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM: A COMMUNITY APPROACH 194 (1995).
163. The National Gang Tracking Network provided grants to states to use gang databases as
pilot programs in 1997 in New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
Leyton, supra note 157, at 147 n.40.
164. Id. at 111–13; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, URBAN STREET GANG
ENFORCEMENT 29 (1997).
165. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING
SYSTEMS: THE RISS PROGRAM: 1998 3 (1999).
166. All. to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 66 F. Supp. 2d 899, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (denying
the City of Chicago’s request to overturn consent decree so the police department could maintain
files on gangs); Leyton, supra note 157, at 113.
167. 527 U.S. 41 (1998).
168. Id. at 64.
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databases because its use of these databases presumably limited discretion by
narrowing enforcement efforts to purported gang members.169
The turn of the century marked a significant change in the organizational
structure, purpose, and culture of street gangs, in that they became less
hierarchical, more fragmented, and driven by different economic interests
(i.e., a shift from drug market to music and social media markets).170
Nevertheless, since 2000, media coverage and public “moral panic”171
regarding gangs has skyrocketed due to law enforcement and media collusion
to commercialize a narrative of increased gang violence, which facilitated
new resources for law enforcement, new anti-gang legislation, and public
acquiescence to law enforcement intelligence practices following the events
of September 11, 2001.172 In 2003, the DOJ launched the National Criminal
Intelligence Sharing Plan to provide resources to federal, regional, and local
law enforcement to create or enhance intelligence databases to target criminal
(including gangs) and terrorist activities domestically and internationally.173
In 2005, the FBI established the National Gang Intelligence Center to
nationally coordinate intelligence and enforcement efforts targeting violent
national and regional gangs, including the creation of a database to centralize
federal, state, and local gang intelligence.174 Throughout the first decade of
the twenty-first century, Congress considered, yet failed to pass, several
legislative measures targeting gangs and gang activity, including the Gang

169. The decision also led to increasing reliance on “hot spot” policing, where police identify
and target high crime areas for suspected gang activity. See Rebecca R. Brown, The Gang’s All
Here: Evaluating the Need for a National Gang Database, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 316
(2009); Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection
of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
101, 134–38 (2002).
170. FORREST STUART, BALLAD OF THE BULLET: GANGS, DRILL MUSIC, AND THE POWER OF
ONLINE INFAMY 11 (2020).
171. Moral panic refers to an escalation of intense, disproportionate, and typically unfounded
concern in response to a perceived social threat posed by an identified group of individuals. See K.
Babe Howell, Gang Policing: The Post Stop-and-Frisk Justification for Profile-Based Policing, 5
U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2015); MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 24–29
(describing the evolution of gangs as moral panics); THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO
MORAL PANICS (Charles Krinksy ed., 2013) (highlighting the types of moral panics, the role of
media, and the impact on governance).
172. Howell, supra note 171, at 12–15; GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 3.
173. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN 12 (2003).
174. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS (2008); SRA
International (SRX) Awarded $16M Contract, STREETINSIDER (Oct. 16, 2007, 4:04 PM),
https://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/SRA+International+%28SRX%29+Awarded+%2
416M+Contract/3032131.html.
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Abatement and Prevention Act of 2007, which directed the Attorney General
to create a federally funded national gang database.175
In the last decade, law enforcement use of social media for gang and
other criminal investigations has become routine because the ubiquity of
social media provides law enforcement with a wide spectrum of covert access
to content on individuals’ and groups’ daily experiences, practices, and
activities.176 Indeed, many scholars have noted that “[p]olice penetration and
control of communication among community members” through social
media monitoring practices and technologies has supplanted community
policing approaches, reduces transparency, and can serve to conceal unlawful
or discriminatory practices because it increases the power imbalance between
police and public.177
This shift in the “datafication” of gang policing was notable in New
York City, where in 2012, anticipating that its stop and frisk program would
be held unconstitutional, the New York Police Department (“NYPD”)
doubled the size of its Gang division and launched its Operation Crew Cut
initiative to monitor gang members’ social media.178
2. Gang Databases in Practice
Gang databases are one of many law enforcement information
technologies used for gang suppression efforts and other law enforcement
priorities. They are compiled and used by several law enforcement and
criminal justice institutions and actors, based on the belief that they function
175. See e.g., Gang Prevention and Effective Deterrence Act of 2003, S. 1735, 108th Cong.
(2003); Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1279, 109th Cong. (2005);
Gang Abatement and Community Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1582, 110th Cong. (2007); Gang
Reduction, Investment, and Prevention Act, H.R. 3922, 110th Cong. (2007); Free Flow of
Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007); Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of
2009, S. 132, 111th Cong. (2009).
176. Desmond Upton Patton et al., Stop and Frisk Online: Theorizing Everyday Racism in
Digital Policing in the Use of Social Media for Identification of Criminal Conduct and Associations,
SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, July–Sept. 2017, at 1, 2–3; see also Memorandum from Charlie Beck, L.A.
Chief of Police, Field Interview Report (May 27, 2015) (on file with author) (asking LAPD officers
to record social media and email account information when completing field interview cards that
are used to record all civilian interactions including those that do not result in arrest or conviction).
177. JEFFREY LANE, THE DIGITAL STREET 157–59 (2019) (noting that law enforcement reliance
on online surveillance can result in less careful criminalization with a weaker rationale and structure
for investigation); see also DANIEL TROTTIER, SOCIAL MEDIA AS SURVEILLANCE: RETHINKING
VISIBILITY IN A CONVERGING WORLD 135–54 (2012); Martin A. French & Simone A. Browne,
Profiles and Profiling Technology: Stereotypes, Surveillance, and Governmentality, in
CRIMINALIZATION, REPRESENTATION, REGULATION: THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT CRIME 251,
274 (Deborah Brock et al. eds., 2014); Patton et al., supra note 176, at 2–3; STUART, supra note
170.
178. See Howell, supra note 171, at 2–14; Patton et al., supra note 176, at 4Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.; LANE, supra note 177, at 128.
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as a “force” or institutional multiplier because they increase the overall
efficiency, speed, and performance179 of all agencies without having to
increase staffing or expend additional funds.180 However, this theory appears
to ignore that the development and maintenance of these databases is very
costly, even when subsidized by grants or in-kind donations.181
Though the specific needs and rationales for use vary, gang databases
make intelligence and investigative information accessible to various
government actors and institutions. Police rely on gang databases to advance
public safety, investigate and arrest persons of interest,182 and deter new or
potential gang members from further engagement or criminal activity.183
Prison and jail officials rely on gang databases to make appropriate
classifications and other decisions for security and institutional order.184
Prosecutors rely on gang databases to inform and craft criminal charges and
plea bargains.185 Judges rely on gang databases to inform bail and sentencing
decisions.186 School officials, public housing authorities, and other non-law
enforcement government actors that have access to or receive information
from gang databases use the information for decisions about community
safety, tenant applications, and assignment of counseling resources.187 As a
179. Mark Poster, Databases as Discourse; or, Electronic Interpellations, in COMPUTERS,
SURVEILLANCE AND PRIVACY 175, 189 (David Lyon & Elia Zureik eds., 1996) (“Databases provide
contemporary governments with vast stores of accessible information about the population that
facilitates the fashioning of policies that maintain stability.”).
180. James Lingerfelt, Technology as a Force Multiplier, in TECHNOLOGY FOR COMMUNITY
POLICING: CONFERENCE REPORT 29 (1996); Kenneth L. Kraemer & Jason Dedrick, Computing and
Public Organizations, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 89, 96 (1997).
181. Samuel Nunn & Kenna Quinet, Evaluating the Effects of Information Technology on
Problem-Oriented-Policing: If It Doesn’t Fit, Must We Quit?, 26 EVALUATION REV. 81, 82 (2002)
(arguing that police agencies often lack the willpower to refuse grants to acquire information
technology even when technology is less useful than expected or is ill-matched for agency
objectives).
182. Ben Popper, How the NYPD Is Using Social Media to Put Harlem Teens Behind Bars,
VERGE (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:15 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2014/12/10/7341077/nypd-harlemcrews-social-media-rikers-prison (describing the case of Jelani Henry, a young Black man from
Harlem who was incarcerated at Rikers Island for nineteen months based on NYPD use of a gang
database and social media monitoring to label him as a criminal affiliate).
183. Leyton, supra note 157, at 109–12; Jacobs, supra note 151, at 705–07; MCCORKLE &
MIETHE, supra note 147, at 58–72; LANE, supra note 177, at 121–28; Charles M. Katz, Issues in the
Production and Dissemination of Gang Statistics: An Ethnographic Study of a Large Midwestern
Police Gang Unit, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 485, 486 (2003).
184. Jacobs, supra note 151, at 705–07; Leyton, supra note 157, at 122.
185. Jacobs, supra note 151, at 705–07; LANE, supra note 177, at 128–49; Leyton, supra note
157, at 122.
186. Jacobs, supra note 151, at 705–07.
187. Leyton, supra note 157, at 122–23; Becki R. Goggins & Dennis A. DeBacco, Survey of
State Criminal History Information Systems, 2016: A Criminal Justice Information Policy Report,
NAT’L
CONSORTIUM
FOR
JUST.
INFO.
&
STATS.
6
(2018),
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result, gang databases are typically developed as intranet-based systems that
are accessible via a web browser or a shared interface, and some are designed
so that new features or third-party applications can be integrated.
There is no federal mandate or guidance on gang databases, so most
policies guiding or regulating gang database construction and maintenance
occur at the state level. Oversight and enforcement of these laws and
administrative rules is difficult because all entries originate at the local level,
and local police often have their own formal and informal policies on entering
and maintaining gang database information that may not be consistent with
statutes.188 Even when databases are merged at the state, regional, or national
level and there are governing statutes, local police often keep their own
databases and files, and such redundancies or inconsistent systems and
practices can vary in neighboring jurisdictions.189 Thus, most gang databases
are constructed and maintained according to statutory or institutional
definitions and/or criteria for designating gangs and gang members.
Yet, defining what constitutes a gang or gang member has been a
significant challenge for law enforcement, particularly because law
enforcement definitions and practices tend to foreground the criminal
activities of gangs, whereas researchers and social welfare practitioners tend
to emphasize the social and cultural aspects of gang formation and activity.190
This schism can be partially attributed to law enforcement’s traditional
approach to criminal profiling, which “relies on the correlation between
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf (highlighting state and federal practices and
laws permitting access to criminal databases for employment or licensing decisions).
188. Jacobs, supra note 151, at 707–08; Barrows & Huff, supra note 162, at 679–80.
189. Jacobs, supra note 151, at 707–08 (“Even if gang databases are combined or merged at a
central . . . level, then it is likely that local police departments would keep their own databases and
files”); Barrows & Huff, supra note 162, at 679 (“Neighboring jurisdictions compile gang
information according to their own gang definitions and criteria, which results in the potential for
inconsistency in information from one gang database to the next.”); Rashida Richardson & Amba
Kak, Suspect Development System: Databasing Marginality and Enforcing Discipline, 55 U. MICH.
J.L.
REFORM
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
41–42),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3868392 (describing that despite the
appearance of centralized data and oversight, gang database practices are diffused at the local level,
resulting in duplicative, informal systems).
190. See Leyton, supra note 157, at 114; see also Mercer L. Sullivan, Maybe We Shouldn’t Study
“Gangs”: Does Reification Obscure Youth Violence?, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 170, 171 (2005)
(“Youth violence takes many organizational forms. Lumping these together as ‘gang’ phenomena
carries distracting baggage. . . . It can, and sometimes does, cloud our view of what we should be
placing front and center . . . .”); Katz, supra note 183, at 487 (“[P]olice do not necessarily document
individuals because of their behavior but rather document individuals according to their own ideas
and beliefs about gang members. . . . [T]his leads to officers documenting individuals based solely
on where individuals live, with whom they associate, what they look like, or what clothes they
wear.”); Forrest Stuart, Code of the Tweet: Urban Gang Violence in the Social Media Age, 67 SOC.
PROBS. 191, 194 (2020) (describing how police assign residents to gang and other criminal
databases based on social media activity that is misinterpreted as evidence of criminal activity).

2022]DEFINING AND DEMYSTIFYING AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS 823
behavioral factors and the past experience of law enforcement in discovering
criminal behavior associated with those factors; thus, profiling rests on the
perceived accuracy of the profile as a predicator of criminality.”191 Unlike
other forms of organized crime such as mafias or mobs, which are
hierarchical groups with strict codes of conduct that exist for the criminal
enterprise, gangs are not necessarily focused only on criminal activity; they
are more amorphous and characterized by their fluidity in membership,
geographic mobility, and differential organizational structures.192
A 2009 study on gang database uses and policies found that “41 states
and the District of Columbia provide statutory definitions of a ‘gang’” but
that most of these definitions are inconsistent and reflect the political, social,
and financial pressures of a given jurisdiction.193 For instance, the statutory
definitions have different requirements for how many individuals must
participate in criminal activity to qualify as a gang—most states require three
or more individuals, some require at least five individuals, and some do not
specify a requisite number of members.194 Overall, the five general elements
reflected in statutory gang definitions are: “number of participants, criminal
activity, hierarchy, alliance or understanding, and a common name or
symbol.”195 The same study found that only fifteen states have statutory
definitions for gang members and most of the definitions are relatively
generic.196
Critics of gang databases note that “because gang membership itself is
not illegal, it does not qualify as an underlying criminal predicate and
therefore does not justify maintenance of intelligence information.”197 Thus,
law enforcement also employs statutory or institutional criteria-based
191. Patton et al., supra note 176, at Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.2 (citing William
M. Carter Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Constitutional Change, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 583 (2014)).
192. Barrows & Huff, supra note 162, at 678–79; MALCOLM W. KLEIN, Introduction to THE
MODERN GANG READER viii (1995) (noting distinctions between gangs and criminal syndicates);
MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 202–09; GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 10 (“Most
experts agree that drug trafficking is a secondary interest for street gang members . . . .”); Leyton,
supra note 157, at 115 (“Most gangs are loosely structured, and many young people may join solely
for safety or acceptance reasons rather than to participate in the gang’s criminal activities.”).
193. Barrows & Huff, supra note 162, at 683–85.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 684.
196. Id. at 685. Compare Leyton, supra note 157, at 115 (“The varied motivations and activities
of gang members renders identification of gang members difficult and highly dependent upon the
definition of the level of involvement that qualifies an individual as a gang ‘member.’”), with
Sullivan, supra note 190 (criticizing the use of monolithic terms like gangs that nullify careful
distinctions between youth gangs and group criminal activities that may not be related to gang
membership).
197. Leyton, supra note 157, at 114.
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classifications to guide gang database designation and limit police officer
discretion. Similar to gang and gang member definitions, the criteria for gang
designations vary significantly, which means that in practice a gang member
in a given state, region, or municipality may not be designated as a gang
member in a neighboring jurisdiction. At least ten states provide statutory
criteria for gang database designation, though the criteria and requirements
for designation differ.198 Amongst these state statutes there are over twentytwo different criteria of gang membership identified, with self-admission
being the only consistent criterion.199
Although these criteria-based classifications were established to limit
law enforcement discretion and quell legal challenges, “[c]ompliance
depends entirely on the good faith and competence of local police officials
who are more likely to fear the negative consequences of failing to identify a
gang member who later engages in violent crime than the consequences (of
which there are none) of erroneously labeling someone a gang member.”200
This concern of overinclusion is exacerbated by the fact that individuals
added to gang databases are not entitled to notice,201 few gang database
policies have purging or audit requirements, and even when they exist,
compliance and active oversight are rare. For instance, CalGang guidelines
include records purging requirements,202 but a 2016 audit found that the
database was rife with errors, unsubstantiated entries, and names that should
have been purged.203 Again in 2020 the Cal DOJ initiated an investigation of
the LAPD’s use of the database following several reports of falsified or
inaccurate records.204
Despite the growing prevalence of gang databases and the exorbitant
amount of public funds spent on law enforcement gang suppression efforts,
the state of the “gang problem[]”205 and the efficacy of the gang database

198. Barrows & Huff, supra note 162, at 685–87.
199. Id.
200. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 24 (2015).
201. There are some exceptions. California law enforcement agencies are required to give
written notice to a minor’s parents or guardian before including the individual in a shared database.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34(b) (West 2014).
202. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11 § 754.4 (2020).
203. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, REPORT NO. 2015-130, CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM 3 (2016). For example, forty-two people in the database were younger than one year of
age at the time of entry and some entries had record purge dates set for more than 100 years in the
future. Id.
204. Gabrielle Canon, California Department of Justice to Investigate LAPD for Falsifying
Gang
Database
Records,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
10,
2020,
4:05
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/02/10/californias-gang-database-underinvestigation/4715847002/.
205.
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solution remains unclear and debatable.206 This is because public
understanding of the problem and law enforcement’s attention to it have
almost always been outsized and driven by political pressure,207 financial
interests,208 moral panics,209 misrepresentations in media,210 and an
overreliance on “therapeutic policing.”211 As a result, gang databases are rife
with many problems such as dirty data, racial bias, interminable collateral
consequences, and counterproductive outcomes.
Research and legal challenges have demonstrated that police data
collection and maintenance practices are severely flawed; thus, dirty data is
endemic in most police datasets and databases.212 Dirty data is a term that
refers to the various inaccuracies, flaws, and misrepresentations reflected in
police data that are “derived from or influenced by corrupt, biased, and
unlawful practices, including data that has been intentionally manipulated or
‘juked,’ as well as data that is distorted by individual and societal biases.”213
While many of the problems that lead to dirty data are systemic, the political
and social dynamics surrounding law enforcement gang suppression efforts
make the prevalence and permanence of dirty data in gang databases seem
Los Angeles taxpayers have not seen a return on their massive investments over the past
quarter century: law enforcement agencies report that there are now six times as many
gangs and at least double the number of gang members in the region. In the undisputed
gang capital of the U.S., more police, more prisons, and more punitive measures haven’t
stopped the cycle of gang violence.
GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 3; see also Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of
Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 115, 118–19 (2005).
206. CHI. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY ON THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S “GANG DATABASE” 29 (2021) (questioning the value of gang databases in
addressing violent crime since they do not remain up-to-date and “cannot effectively track the
shifting alliances and conflicts across many small gang factions” that currently exist in Chicago).
207. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 3–7; Katz, supra note 183, at 489.
208. Majorie Zatz, Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of a Moral Panic, 11
CONTEMP. CRISES 129, 130, 153 (1987) (finding a police department purposefully manipulated
estimate of gang membership to receive federal funding); Katz, supra note 183, at 489.
209. MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 15–17, 58–60.
210. Richardson & Kak, supra note 189 (manuscript at 47–48).
211. Forrest Stuart established therapeutic policing as when cops diagnose and implement ideas
about residents and their problems while relying on the threat or use of criminal sanctions. FORREST
STUART, DOWN, OUT, AND UNDER ARREST: POLICING AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN SKID ROW 6
(2016).
212. See, e.g., Richardson et al., supra note 86, at 16–26; Katz, supra note 183, at 511 (“Police
researchers have long recognized that police record-keeping practices regularly yield unreliable
data.”); Henry H. Brownstein, The Social Production of Crime Statistics, 2 JUST. RSCH. & POL’Y
73 (2000) (finding many flaws with the quality of police data and that police have manipulated
crime statistics because of political and social pressure).
213. Richardson et al., supra note 86, at 18; see also MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at
57–60 (describing how criminal justice data and statistics are misleading because police “routinely
overcharge” arrestees, a majority of cases are never prosecuted, and law enforcement may need high
crime statistics to justify budget requests); Leyton, supra note 157, at 118.
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fated.214 Police departments have inflated statistics on gang-related crime or
activity to receive federal grants215 and invented gangs to unlawfully target
and harass groups.216 Also, poorly constructed definitions and criteria for
designating gangs and gang members increase the risks of police officers
relying on stereotypes and biases to determine gang activity.217 Indeed, gang
databases also exhibit extreme racial biases, with Black and Latinx people
making up over 90% of people included in the databases nationally,218 even
214. See Albert J. Meehan, The Organizational Career of Gang Statistics: The Politics of
Policing Gangs, 41 SOCIO. Q. 337, 362 (2000) (describing how the record-keeping practices that
produce gang-related statistics are a byproduct of social and political pressures and practical
decisions and actions); G. David Curry, Richard A. Ball & Scott H. Decker, Estimating the National
Scope of Gang Crime from Law Enforcement Data, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.: RSCH. IN BRIEF 3 (Aug.
1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/161477NCJRS.pdf (“The capacity to report
gang crime statistics was significantly related to city size . . . .”); Katz, supra note 183, at 489
(“[G]ang statistics are constructed by the police in response to more insidious political and financial
pressures.”); Leyton, supra note 157, at 118 (“The high potential for inaccuracy is particularly
problematic when funding for anti-gang initiatives creates incentives to be over- rather than underinclusive.”).
215. Zatz, supra note 208, at 153 (finding the Phoenix Police Department exaggerated the
severity of its gang problems to receive federal funding); Robert J. Bursik & Harold G. Grasmick,
Defining and Researching Gangs, in THE MODERN GANG READER (Cheryl L. Maxson et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2005) (suggesting that local police departments may have a vested interest in demonstrating
a gang problem or gang activity to access federal grants); Nunn & Quinet, supra note 181, at 82
(“Few agencies have the fiscal willpower to refuse grants to purchase equipment, especially in
police agencies that have been traditional targets of money from the old Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, the National Institute of Justice, or the Office of Law Enforcement
Technology Commercialization.”).
216. Dave Biscobing, ‘Prime for Abuse’: Lack of Oversight Lets Phoenix Police Add Protesters
to Gang Database, ABC 15 ARIZ. (June 5, 2021, 3:08 PM), https://www.abc15.com/news/localnews/investigations/protest-arrests/prime-for-abuse-lack-of-oversight-lets-phoenix-police-addprotesters-to-gang-database.
217. Katz, supra note 183, at 489 (“The confusion over such terms may put officers and agencies
in the position of having to label gang members, gangs, and gang crime according to their own
preferences and ideas rather than by any established and clear set of criteria that can be agreed on
by all.”); Decker & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 15, at 286 (“[P]olicy responses to gang activity are
in large part dependent upon socially constructed definitions. The absence of an agreed upon
working definition can lead either to minimizing the problem or to over-estimating its incidence.”).
218. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 4; Daryl Khan, New York City’s Gang Database Is
99% People of Color, Chief of Detectives Testifies, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (June 14, 2018),
https://jjie.org/2018/06/14/new-york-citys-gang-database-is-99-people-of-color-chief-ofdetectives-testifies/; Richard Winton, California Gang Database Plagued with Errors,
Unsubstantiated Entries, State Auditor Finds, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016, 9:10 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-calgangs-audit-20160811-snap-story.html (“The
database is overwhelmingly male—some 93.1%—and disproportionately minority—64.9% Latino
and 20.5% black.”); CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST., WE ARE THE PREY: RACIAL PROFILING AND
POLICING OF YOUTH IN NEW BEDFORD 20 (2021) (finding that the New Bedford Police
Department’s gang database is overrepresented with young Black and Latino men and alleging that
the police department’s gang identification practices are subjective); Chris Gelardi, More Kids and
Overwhelmingly Black: New Records Show Concerning Trends in D.C. Gang Database, INTERCEPT
(Jan. 9, 2022), https://theintercept.com/2022/01/09/dc-police-gang-database-mpd/ (“Metropolitan
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though research suggests that at least 25% of gang members generally and
40% of adolescent gang members are white.219 Such disparities are likely
indicative of racial profiling police practices and racially biased police
priorities,220 but also demonstrate that gang databases constitute what
surveillance scholar Simone Browne terms “racializing surveillance—when
enactments of surveillance reify boundaries along racial lines, thereby
reifying race, and where the outcome of this is often discriminatory and
violent treatment.”221
The discriminatory outcomes of racialized surveillance are not limited
to the racial disparities within gang databases; they also have widespread,
cumulative effects on individuals and their communities,222 particularly

Police Department’s gang database almost tripled in size over eight years, and nearly nine out of 10
entries with a race listed are Black people, who make up 46 percent of D.C.’s population . . . .”).
219. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 4; A.C. Thompson, Ali Winston & Darwin
BondGraham, Racist, Violent, Unpunished: A White Hate Group’s Campaign of Menace,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 19, 2017, 2:01 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/white-hate-group-campaign-of-menace-rise-above-movement
(profiling the scope and severity of white hate groups and gangs in the United States and the lack
of law enforcement suppression efforts targeting these groups); see also Donald Ladd, Only Black
People Prosecuted Under Mississippi Gang Law Since 2010, JACKSON FREE PRESS (Mar. 29, 2018,
1:32 PM), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2018/mar/29/only-black-people-prosecutedunder-mississippi-gan/ (finding that between 2010 and 2017, only Black people were arrested under
the Mississippi Gang Law, even though the Mississippi Association of Gang Investigators declared
that 53% of verified gang members are white).
220. MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 201 (“Hate groups—such as KKK or
Skinheads—are recognized as gangs in some places, but not others.”); Leyton, supra note 157, at
120 (“[S]ince law enforcement’s definition of a gang is broad enough to encompass many groups
of white persons . . . these statistics clearly reflect the officers’ racially-based preconceptions of
gang members, rather than any objective of carefully applied criteria.” (quoting Letter from Edward
M. Chen et al., ACLU, to Representative Don Edwards, Chair, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Civil & Constitutional Rights, U.S. House of Representatives 26 (Aug. 6, 1993));
Scot Wortley & Julian Tanner, Data, Denials, and Confusion: The Racial Profiling Debate in
Toronto, 45 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 367, 369–70 (2003) (arguing that racial
profiling typically comes to light through racial disparities in police practices).
221. SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 8 (2015).
222. Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public
Places, 56 AM. SOCIO. REV. 101, 115 (1991) (“The cumulative impact of racial discrimination
accounts for the special way that blacks have of looking at and evaluating interracial
incidents. . . . [B]lacks look at white-black interaction through a lens colored by personal and group
experience with cross-institutional and cross-generational discrimination. . . . What many whites
see as black ‘paranoia’ . . . is simply a realistic sensitivity to white-black interaction created and
constantly reinforced by the two types of cumulative discrimination . . . .”); GREENE & PRANIS,
supra note 148, at 6 (“Communities of color suffer not only from the imposition of aggressive police
tactics that can resemble martial law, but also from the failure of such tactics to pacify their
neighborhoods.”).
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reinforcing distrust of the police223 and exacerbating the collateral
consequences of the criminal justice system in addition to the unique
consequences of gang designation.224 For instance, even when gang
databases have policies with purging requirements, compliance is rare and
there is typically no requirement to notify individuals for an opportunity to
correct misclassification. This means that a gang database designation can
have a perpetual blacklist effect on individuals, thus leading to differential
treatment by private and public actors and inhibiting or completely
foreclosing housing, educational, employment, financial, immigration,
public benefits, and social opportunities for a significant period of time, if
not indefinitely.225 These cumulative effects can be taken up by feedback
loops where the norms and conditions of systemic racism and social
inequities are validated by selective observations and dirty data, which serve
to concretize and justify the discriminatory practices, policies, and even
technologies that created or at least perpetuate underlying conditions.226
3. Applying Gang Databases to the Narrow Definition
The definitions help clarify gang databases as ADS. Gang databases
currently evade scrutiny because they are seen as passive or technologically
primitive, even though they employ similar computational methods, perform
similar functions, inform governance, and produce negative outcomes like
other technologies that are indubitably considered ADS, like predictive
policing.227 The clarity offered by these definitions also helps overcome
223. See, e.g., GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 6; Leyton, supra note 157, at 121 (“Some
warn that mistaken inclusion reinforces distrust of the police by young people of color and that the
police harassment may actually push youth into gangs.”).
224. JACOBS, supra note 200, at 227–74; GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 5 (“[M]any gang
control policies make the process of leaving more rather than less difficult by continuing to target
former members after their gang affiliation has ended.”).
225. Leyton, supra note 157, at 120–23; JACOBS, supra note 200, at 227–74; POLICING IN CHI.
RSCH. GRP., TRACKED AND TARGETED: EARLY FINDINGS ON CHICAGO’S GANG DATABASE 10
(2018),
http://erasethedatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Tracked-Targeted-0217-r.pdf;
Katz, supra note 185, at 513.
226. French & Browne, supra note 177, at 274–77; GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 148, at 6
(“One researcher argues that in Chicago, for example, a cycle of police suppression and
incarceration, and a legacy of segregation, have actually helped to sustain unacceptably high levels
of gang violence.”); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 76 (2007) (“[T]oday’s
information technologies ‘embed and inscribe work’ in ways that are hard to see but freeze values,
opinions and rhetoric in technology.”); RICHARD JENKINS, SOCIAL IDENTITY 192–96 (Routledge
ed., 2d ed. 2004) (arguing that reliance on stereotypes is an inherent function of bureaucratic
classification practices because it enables the exercise of discretion by enhancing group
identification and a sense of predictability).
227. Rashida Richardson & Amba Kak, It’s Time for a Reckoning About This Foundational
Piece
of
Police
Technology,
SLATE
(Sept.
11,
2020,
1:38
PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/its-time-for-a-reckoning-about-criminal-intelligence-
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subversive rhetorical tactics used by law enforcement officials to obscure
public perceptions about ADS, such as referring to ADS use as “intelligencedriven” or “precision” policing.228 This Section demonstrates how gang
databases meet the narrow definition and how policymakers within the
criminal justice sector should evaluate the components of the definitions.
(a) “Any systems, software, or process that use computation”
Gang databases, and most commonly used databases today, are designed
using a relational model,229 which is encoded into a software system format
for commercial sale or internal use. Some gang databases are designed for
interoperability so that additional applications or software can be integrated
to provide new features or modules, like map displays to visually display and
track patterns of violence in an area.
Most gang databases are software systems that rely on some form of
computation to function, but some databases also include features or modules
that rely on advanced mathematical models to perform a specific task (e.g.,
data visualizations) or explicitly provide statistical analysis.230
Additionally, some gang database policies that provide criteria for
designating individuals as gang members require law enforcement personnel
to perform basic computations to make a designation. For example, the
Providence Police Department’s previous gang database policy included a
list of fourteen weighted criteria for designating a person as a gang member
databases.html (“[D]atabases are typically considered simple record repositories, often seen as the
‘first stage’ in the creation of more high-tech A.I. systems. But these databases perform varied and
advanced functions of profiling, not unlike systems of predictive policing.”); Richardson & Kak,
supra note 189 (manuscript at 13–16) (describing how databases are presented as bureaucratic
systems of record-keeping and classification, but in practice they are used by governments for
profiling and social control).
228. Pervaiz Shallwani & Julian Cummings, In Letter to Uniformed Members, NYPD
Commissioner Says They Will Have to Fight Crime Differently and with Fewer Street Stops, CNN
(June 17, 2020, 5:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/us/nypd-commissioner-letter-crimeless-street-stops/index.html (“That means for the NYPD’s part, we’ll redouble our precisionpolicing efforts.”); Mayor De Blasio Appoints Dermot Shea New York City Police Commissioner,
N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/p1104a/mayor-deblasio-appoints-dermot-shea-new-york-city-police-commissioner (“Shea was appointed Chief of
Crime Control Strategies and Deputy Commissioner for Operations, where he oversaw the
CompStat system and honed a new generation of precision approaches that helped drive crime to
record lows. He focused the Department not just around arrests, but around intelligence-driven
prosecutions . . . .”).
229. CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 158, at 2. A relational model is an approach to managing
and structuring data in the form of relations.
230. See,
e.g.,
SRA
INT’L
INC.,
2008
ANNUAL
REPORT
2
(2008),
https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/s/NYSE_SRX_2008.pdf (“Our
GangNet® database system is a browser-based investigative, analysis, and statistical resource used
by law enforcement officials to record and track gang members and their activities.”).
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and each criterion was given a point value.231 The policy provided that
anyone with ten or more points should be included in the gang database and
police officers would compute the matching criteria, except for selfadmission, which had an automatic point value of ten.232
(b) “to aid or replace government decisions, judgments, and/or
policy implementation”
Gang databases aid government decisions and judgments, as well as
policy implementation, depending on a jurisdiction’s policy priorities. As
referenced above, most criminal justice actors and institutions use gang
databases to aid various decisions, and other non-criminal justice government
officials use the databases or information shared from gang databases to aid
decisions regarding institutional safety and resource allocation. In fact, after
the Supreme Court decision in Morales, government actors have increased
their reliance on gang databases to avoid legal challenges, though subsequent
federal district and state court decisions have questioned or invalidated the
use of certain gang database criteria as a predicate for police action.233
Gang databases can also be used to aid policy implementation,
particularly after a crisis234 or in jurisdictions that have identified targeting
gang activity as a priority. This is because law enforcement considers gang
databases as one of several techniques and tools employed for gang
suppression efforts.235 Reliance on gang databases for policy implementation
is also more likely in police departments with a history of civil rights
violations. For example, in Gang Policing: The Post Stop-and-Frisk

231. Intelligence Assessment Database Policy, PROVIDENCE POLICE DEP’T (2018),
https://upriseri.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-01-01-PPD-Gang-database-policy.pdf; see
also Steph Machado, Community Group Files Suit over Providence ‘Gang Database,’ WPRI (Jul.
23, 2019, 9:59 PM), https://www.wpri.com/news/local-news/providence/community-group-filessuit-over-providence-gang-database/.
232. Intelligence Assessment Database Policy, supra note 231; Machado, supra note 231.
233. See, e.g., NAACP Anne Arundel Cnty. Branch v. City of Annapolis, 133 F. Supp. 2d 795,
808 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that making hand signals associated with drug-related activity as a
predicate for dispersal order was unconstitutionally vague and infringed on First Amendment
rights); Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1244–45 (D.N.M. 2000) (holding that wearing clothing
perceived to be gang-related as a predicate for dispersal order violated vagueness doctrine); Johnson
v. Athens-Clark Cnty., 529 S.E. 2d 613, 616 (Ga. 2000) (holding that using a person’s presence in
a known drug area as a predicate for police action is unconstitutionally vague).
234. Crises, whether real or fabricated, fuel moral and crime panics that law enforcement
institutions leverage for more resources and political support. Criminologists Richard C. McCorkle
and Terance D. Miethe note that “[a]fter the crisis, there is little retrenchment [in police budgets and
power] because the public and elected officials have come to believe that an increased police
presence is required to sustain the peace, a perception nurtured by law enforcement bureaucrats
interested in maintaining funding levels.” MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 59.
235. Leyton, supra note 157, at 110.
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Justification for Profile-Based Policing, legal scholar K. Babe Howell details
how in 2013, the NYPD increased use of its gang database and covert
surveillance to advance a new policy priority of policing “crews,” a law
enforcement term for gangs that are loosely organized, neighborhood-based,
and primarily comprised of young people.236 She argues that this increased
reliance on gang databases was intentional because their use was less likely
to be subject to review or legally challenged since they are not governed by
constitutional or statutory requirements like the NYPD’s recently invalidated
stop-and-frisk regime.237
(c) “that impact opportunities, access, liberties, rights, and/or
safety”
Gang databases impact individuals’ and communities’ civil rights and
liberties, access to opportunities, and safety. Though law enforcement’s gang
database practices vary greatly, research on and legal challenges to gang
databases have asserted and in some cases demonstrated that government use
of gang databases impacts rights to equal protection, due process, association,
privacy, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom from
unwanted false-light publicity, and freedom from racial harassment and
intimidation.238 Gang database designation is also stigmatizing, therefore
limiting or completely foreclosing educational, employment, housing, social,
immigration, and economic opportunities for individuals in the database.239
Moreover, since most gang databases are disproportionately composed of
Black and Latinx people, the aforementioned collateral consequences of gang
database designation reproduce and compound the social, economic, and
political disparities and disadvantages endured by these communities
because of centuries of structural and institutional racism.240

236. Howell, supra note 171, at 4–6.
237. Id. at 14.
238. See e.g., Leyton, supra note 157, at 122–40; Wright, supra note 205, at 117–18.
239. See, e.g., Irene Romulo, ‘Gang Contracts’ in Cicero and Berwyn Schools Raise Concerns
About
Criminalization
of
Youth,
INJUSTICE
WATCH
(May
26,
2021),
https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/juvenile-justice/2021/cicero-gang-contracts/ (describing the
use of a gang database by schools and police departments in Cicero, Illinois, to “force students into
alternative schools or push them out of school completely”); Letter from Zoey Chenitz et al., CoChair, Civil Rights Committee, to Philip Eure, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General 3
(Apr. 27, 2021) (“Gang database policing also dehumanizes members of Black and Latinx
communities and severely restricts their freedom of association and their right to express
themselves . . . because most gang raids take place in low-income communities, typically targeting
[New York City Housing Authority] public housing developments, the practice effectively
criminalizes poverty . . . .”).
240. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 223–40 (Rebecca M. Blank
et al. eds., 2004) (explaining theories and consequences of cumulative disadvantage); GANDY, JR.,
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Gang database use also has individual and community-wide
consequences on safety. Not only are individuals identified in gang databases
subjected to increased police scrutiny and harassment, but so are their family
members, neighbors, and other individuals that share any characteristics (e.g.,
race, age, height, gender presentation).241 Indeed, criminology scholars have
indicated “[t]he absence of a clear and substantive definition of gangs and
gang members may also serve to focus police attention on poor minority
youth, who follow normative systems different from those held by a majority
of police officers.”242 Research has also demonstrated that this heightened
scrutiny is often accompanied by more excessive force by police officers,
which directly impacts the safety of designated individuals and their
community.243 Finally, when gang database information is leaked or
otherwise revealed to non-governmental actors, individuals or areas can be
targeted by rival gangs for violence.244
(d) “Automated [d]ecision [s]ystems can involve predicting,
classifying, optimizing, identifying, and/or recommending”
Gang databases involve classification and identification. Though
classification is an inherent function of any database that organizes
information,245 it is an explicit function of gang databases because law
enforcement uses statutory, formal, and informal policies and criteria to
determine what individuals and information to include. Further, law
enforcement has full discretion in how it characterizes246 individuals (e.g.,
supra note 16, at 81 (arguing that the widespread use of ADS automates and reproduces
discrimination, thus negatively affecting the life chances of Black people).
241. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Chicagoans for an End to the Gang Database et al. v. City of
Chicago, No. 18-cv-04242 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2018) (alleging the Chicago Police Department relied
on gang database designations to “harass, falsely arrest, and falsely imprison class members”);
CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST., supra note 218, at 22 (highlighting that the New Bedford Police
Department used gang labels of individuals to stop and harass their family members).
242. MCCORKLE & MIETHE, supra note 147, at 208; see also LANE, supra note 177, at vii–xi
(detailing the street and social media practices of young people in Harlem, New York, to avoid,
diffuse, or walk away from violence and gang activity and how several criminal justice actors
misinterpret this behavior because of their own biases, lack of cultural context, and different
normative systems); Stuart, supra note 190, at 194 (“[L]aw enforcement personnel overwhelmingly
lack the cultural competencies and knowledge necessary to accurately comprehend and regulate the
cultural practices of urban youth. Criminal justice actors are particularly prone to misidentify and
thus criminalize non-violent interactions and ordinary behaviors, especially those related to
expressions of black cultural identity . . . .”).
243. Katz, supra note 183, at 490.
244. Barrows & Huff, supra note 162, at 678.
245. LYON, supra note 226, at 73.
246. “The act of classification is a moral one because each standard or category valorizes one
viewpoint and silences another; it can create advantage or suffering.” Id. (citing BOWKER & STAR,
supra note 15, at 5–6 (1999)).
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gang member, gang affiliate, or person of interest) and information (e.g.,
labeling social media activity as gang or criminal activity). Once added,
database subjects are reduced to the fixed classifications of the gang database.
These fixed classifications are a byproduct of database design, the routine
surveillance practices that precede gang database designations, and
institutional priorities related to gangs.247
In a similar vein, gang databases also involve identification, though as
with many ADS, such identifications may not reflect reality. Gang databases
allow law enforcement to identify individuals and groups as gangs, gang
members, gang affiliates, or other persons of interest classifications, and
information or observations as gang or criminal activity and areas. Since all
of these labels are based on unstable legal classifications and subjective
normative judgments, the identification enabled by gang databases is dubious
despite being heavily relied upon by various government actors and
institutions for decision-making.248
III. EXEMPTIONS TO THE ADS DEFINITIONS
Most modern software, systems, and processors used by governments
rely on algorithms and statistical techniques to perform their intended
function, so while the definitions are intentionally comprehensive, they are
not intended to subject every technical system used in government to
regulation. For this reason, it is important for policymakers to identify
systems exempt from the ADS definitions. Exemptions provide more clarity
for oversight and enforcement of ADS laws and regulations, as well as quell
claims that an ADS law or rule is overbroad or vague.

247. Id. at 74 (“On a much larger scale, bureaucracies also use lists as a means of organizing
reality according to organizational priorities, and . . . surveillance categories make people up to fit
them . . . .”); Poster, supra note 179, at 185 (describing how database subjects lack agency to know
or correct entries so their identity and relevant narratives reflect database rules of formation or
underlying policy objectives); French & Browne, supra note 177, at 275 (“This routine surveillance
work is structured in relation to the knowledge needs of other risk-managing organizations.
Accordingly, police use categories like ‘age, race, gender, and ethnicity’ to describe their
observations and to build risk profiles of populations—this activity ‘forces people into specific
institutional identities.’”).
248. JACOBS, supra note 200, at 24–25; LANE, supra note 177, at 141–42 (recounting how
prosecutors use gang database identification to create or support criminal conspiracy charges);
Leyton, supra note 157, at 114–20 (describing how the difficulty in identifying gang members can
lead to inaccurate entries, and the challenges of compliance and quality control undermine the
accuracy of gang databases); Marjorie S. Zatz & Richard P. Krecker, Jr., Anti-Gang Initiatives as
Racialized Policy, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE, supra note
157, at 173, 176–78 (highlighting the broad discretion police have in making youth gang
designations and how these identifications influence risk assessment scores and juvenile court
decisions).
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Exemptions are not universal and require local and context-specific
evaluation about how the system is operationalized by government agencies,
the history of the system’s use in government, and its impact. Such analysis
is necessary because cursory reviews that merely rely on marketing materials
or agency declarations can lead to false conclusions that exempt systems may
appear innocuous but pose serious risks to the public or threaten the integrity
of government agencies. Additionally, blanket exemptions can create a
perverse incentive for ADS developers to design or reproduce technologies
in a way that can evade scrutiny or regulation.249 The following Sections
evaluate two technical systems commonly used by government agencies and
offer explanations on whether they should be exempted from the ADS
definitions.
A. Email Spam Filters
Email filtering is a process of organizing or inspecting email according
to a specified criterion, which can be performed manually by a human or
automated processing.250 The most common form of automated email
filtering is the detection and removal of unsolicited, unwanted, or computer
virus-affected messages (spam), which are colloquially known as spam
filters.251 Spam filters employ several heuristic methods that rely on
probabilistic classifiers to detect and distinguish spam emails from desired
emails, and they typically apply to inbound email.252 Probabilistic classifiers
are a statistical technique that calculates the probability of a specified
observation or event,253 so in this case it calculates the probability that an
email is or is not spam. Heuristic methods are the different types of
predefined criteria or rules about the content or other email features that guide
249. The Anh Han et al., To Regulate or Not: A Social Dynamics Analysis of an Idealised AI
Race, 69 J. A.I. RSCH. 881 (2020) (finding that the AI arms race narrative can lead AI developers to
ignore ethical and safety precautions in order to attain or maintain a dominant position); Meredith
Whittaker,
The
Steep
Cost
of
Capture,
INTERACTIONS
(Nov.–Dec.
2021),
https://interactions.acm.org/archive/view/november-december-2021/the-steep-cost-of-capture
(arguing that technology companies are incentivized to push for regulations that aid their
concentration of power rather than democratic values or outcomes); Yochai Benkler, Don’t Let
Industry Write the Rules for AI, NATURE (May 1, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586019-01413-1 (arguing that the technology industry’s participation in policy and regulatory discourse
is harmful because it frames AI research and regulation to benefit its interest over societal interests).
250. Emmanuel Gbenga Dada et al., Machine Learning for Email Spam Filtering: Review,
Approaches
and
Open
Research
Problems,
HELIYON
(June
2019),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844018353404;
Spam
Filtering,
FORTINET,
Error!
Hyperlink
reference
not
valid.https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/spam-filters (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
251. Dada et al., supra note 250; Spam Filtering, supra note 250.
252. Dada et al., supra note 250.
253. Id.
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the filtering process.254 For example, content spam filters evaluate the
content of an email by scanning for words that are common in spam emails.
These filters typically employ a natural language processing algorithm
known as “bag-of-words” to identify the occurrence or presence of words in
a predefined corpus.255
Though spam filters are a common built-in feature in all commercial
emails, spam filters are important for government agency emails because of
harmful effects spam can have on government information technology
infrastructure.256 In general, spam negatively affects an individual user’s
computer storage capacity and network bandwidth. However, a “huge
volume of spam mails flowing through the computer networks have
destructive effects on the memory space of email servers, communication
bandwidth, CPU power and user time.”257 Additionally, malicious spam
emails can lead to data breaches at organizations.258
While spam filters meet most of the technical aspects of the ADS
definitions, in that they are systems that use computation and involve
functions like classification, they do not inform government decision-making
or impact the public, except when they fail to work. For example, an
aggressive or flawed spam filter could improperly block important
government emails, which can affect decision-making or policy
implementation in a manner that impacts the public. Yet, even in this
predicament the spam filter and its flawed outcomes are not designed or used
for aiding government decision-making or policy implementation, and the
connection between government action and societal impact is conjectural.
Thus, spam filters can be exempted from the ADS definitions.

254. Id.
255. Nikita Sharma, Spam Filtering Using Bag-of-Words: Guide to Building Your Own Spam
Filter in Python, HEARTBEAT (May 12, 2020), https://heartbeat.fritz.ai/spam-filtering-using-bagof-words-1c5484ff07f1.
256. Anti-Spam
Toolkit:
Governments,
INTERNET
SOC’Y,
https://www.internetsociety.org/spamtoolkit/governments/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2022) (describing
how spam can be harmful to government infrastructure and offering guidance on how governments
can combat these risks).
257. Dada et al., supra note 250.
258. Brian Krebs, Florence, Ala. Hit by Ransomware 12 Days After Being Alerted by
KrebsOnSecurity,
KREBSONSECURITY
(June
9,
2020),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/06/florence-ala-hit-by-ransomware-12-days-after-being-alertedby-krebsonsecurity/; Andrew Westrope, L.A. County Confirms Phishing Attack, No Services
Disrupted, GOVTECH (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/security/la-county-confirmsphishing-attack-no-services-disrupted.html.
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B. Accounting Software
Accounting software systems have become an integral information
technology for private and public institutions. Accounting software typically
includes various modules dealing with different aspects of accounting like
recording and processing financial transactions (e.g., expenses and payments
received), tracking and overseeing funds and finances, managing payroll, and
budgeting. Some accounting software also includes enterprise resource
planning (“ERP”) applications, which integrate and include financial
management and operations functions.259 Accounting software can be
developed in-house, purchased from a third-party vendor,260 or be a
combination of both, and the software can be internet-enabled or intranetbased, both allowing for optimal accessibility. In the United States,
accounting software used by state and local governments often comply with
standards established by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board
(“GASB”), a private non-profit and non-governmental organization that
establishes government accounting and financial reporting standards.261 In
fact, thirty-two states mandate compliance with GASB standards by statute,
and thirteen states and the District of Columbia comply without statutory
mandate, but in hopes of receiving favorable audits.262
A cursory review would suggest that accounting software systems
should be exempted from our ADS definitions; however, I recommend that
these systems require context and system specific analysis to make an
appropriate determination. While most accounting software is used for
financial management tasks, some systems, particularly those including ERP
applications, can be leveraged for identification and classification purposes,
in addition to informing government decisions and judgments that impact
government employees and constituents. This is because these more
comprehensive or advanced accounting software systems are better
understood as management accounting tools, which seek to improve the
efficiency and productivity of an existing operation while still providing
259. For example, Oracle makes enterprise resource planning applications, modules, and allinclusive systems. Oracle’s “Financials” products include traditional accounting functions and
services. Oracle also offers other products that perform more advanced features and analytics for
human resources, supply chain, business planning, competition strategy, and compliance. See
Oracle Fusion Cloud Enterprise Resource, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/erp/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2022).
260. For example: Intuit’s Quickbooks, SAP’s Business One, or Accufund’s Municipal
Accounting Software.
261. About
the
GASB,
GOVERNMENTAL
ACCT.
STANDARDS
BD.,
https://www.gasb.org/aboutgasb (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
262. Emilia Istrate, Cecilia Mills & Daniel Brookmyer, NAT’L ASS’N FOR COUNTIES,
COUNTING MONEY: STATE & GASB STANDARDS FOR COUNTY FINANCIAL REPORTING 2 (2016),
https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/CountingMoney_report_FINALv2.pdf.
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traditional accounting modules.263 This distinction is significant, since many
of the methods and practices that inform modern management accounting,
including its software applications, emanate from slavery.264 Indeed, the
systematic accounting practices developed and advanced on antebellum
plantations blended record keeping, data analysis, surveillance, and
experimentation with the distribution of incentives and punishment in a way
that transformed industrial management and the global commodity
economy.265
Accounting software systems can function as private rulemaking, in that
record keeping and data analysis can be used to covertly and informally
surveil employees, contractors, or populations whose information is
particularly visible and accessible through software modules, as well as
inform sophisticated systems of incentives and penalties to manipulate
conduct and operations.266 When understood in this context, government
agencies’ use of accounting software can involve classification or
optimization when an agency tries to lower operating expenses, which can in
turn inform decisions about resource allocation or austerity measures,267 or
involve identification for employment decisions such as hiring, layoffs,

263. See Elisabetta Mafrolla, Management Accounting as a Science: From Costs and Benefits
Analysis of Productions to Strategic Planning of Uncertainty, 12 J. MOD. ACCT. & AUDITING 577,
577–78 (2016) (describing management accounting in relation to the more colloquially understood
financial accounting); She-I Chang et al., A Delphi Examination of Public Sector ERP
Implementation Issues, 2000 PROC. 21ST INT’L CONF. ON INFO. SYS. 494–95 (describing ERP use
by government agencies in Queensland); GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA, ENTERPRISE RESOURCE
PLANNING (ERP) SYSTEM PROCUREMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION SERVICES RFP “ERP-2014” 5
(2014), http://www.glendaleca.gov/home/showdocument?id=19250 [hereinafter ERP-2014].
264. CAITLIN ROSENTHAL, ACCOUNTING FOR SLAVERY: MASTERS AND MANAGEMENT xii–xiii
(2018); EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM xxiii (2014).
265.
Their practices rapidly transformed the southern states into the dominant force in the
global cotton market, and cotton was the world’s most widely traded commodity at the
time, as it was the key raw material during the first century of the industrial revolution.
The returns from cotton monopoly powered the modernization of the rest of the American
economy, and by the time of the Civil War, the United States had become the second
nation to undergo large-scale industrialization. In fact, slavery’s expansion shaped every
crucial aspect of the economy and politics of the new nation—not only increasing its
power and size, but also, eventually, dividing US politics, differentiating regional
identities and interests, and helping to make civil war possible.
BAPTIST, supra note 264, at xxi; see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 264, at 94–120.
266. ROSENTHAL, supra note 264, at 94–100.
267. David Heald & David Steel, The Governance of Public Bodies in Times of Austerity, 50
BRIT. ACCT. REV. 149, 150 (2018) (describing the use of accounting practices and systems during
a period of fiscal austerity).
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scheduling, and government contracting.268 Such decisions can impact
constituent access to government services and resources, especially when use
of accounting software informs austerity measures. When the impact of such
decisions are not evenly distributed across a community (e.g., school or fire
department closures) the effects are not only immediate and long-term269 but
compounded, thus impeding or at least posing a risk to safety, civil rights,
and civil liberties.270 Additionally, when accounting systems fail they can
affect a municipality’s overall budgeting process.271 Thus, policymakers
must assess not only what type of accounting software is being used, but how
it is being used to determine whether it should be exempted from the ADS
definition.
CONCLUSION
In order for an ADS law to be successfully complied with, enforced, and
interpreted, various audiences must understand what ADS are and their
impact. Yet, this can only be accomplished if there is shared meaning that
does not require or presume particular knowledge, expertise, or experience.
The comprehensive and narrow ADS definitions achieve this goal by
clarifying the various forms ADS can take, the role of computation, their
relationship to governance, the actions or functions they are performing, and
naming their impact in a sector and discipline agnostic manner. In addition
to providing shared meaning, this definitional approach makes legislative and
regulatory definitions more adaptable so that they can be adopted across
jurisdictions that have different legal frameworks for addressing legal issues
presented by emergent technologies.
These definitions also help demystify ADS as objective or neutral tools.
The definitions and the “real world” use cases demonstrate that ADS are
social and political artifacts as much as they are technical, in that they reflect
268. ERP-2014, supra note 263, at 21–22 (detailing several module design requirements that are
used to inform employment decisions and judgments).
269. Aldo Toledo, San Mateo County Court to Cut 20 Positions, Reduce Office Hours by Half
Amid
Budget
Cuts,
MERCURY
NEWS
(Aug.
6,
2020,
4:23
AM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/05/san-mateo-county-court-to-cut-20-positions-reduceoffice-hours-by-half-amid-budget-cuts/ (detailing various consequences of large reduction in
county court staff due to layoffs and furloughs).
270. See generally FLOOD, supra note 2 (describing long-term consequences and safety
problems created by closure of New York City fire departments in primarily lower-income and more
diverse communities).
271. See, e.g., Ben Tansey, Council Adopts Provisional Budget: Finance Department Receives
$80,000 to Clean Up Books, S. PASADENAN. (June 25, 2020), https://southpasadenan.com/counciladopts-provisional-budget-finance-department-receives-80000-to-clean-up-books/ (cleaning up
accounting system failure has used significant resources and caused delays in South Pasadena’s
annual audit and other budgeting projects).
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and concretize the public policies and practices that preceded their
development and use. The education policies that gave rise to teacher
evaluation systems reflect the misguided logic of the education
accountability movement that preceded their development, and their
continued use contributes to growing educational inequities in American
public schools. It is also not a coincidence that gang database designations
produce a perpetual blacklist effect, since the intelligence practices that
preceded and influenced the development and use of gang databases,
especially law enforcement targeting of political activists or alleged
Communists, yielded similar outcomes. Since public discourse about ADS
often ignores these histories and the full extent of their social consequences,
the tendency for ADS to enable or facilitate government subjugation is often
rendered banal or normalized. Therefore, the ADS definitions and analytical
framework offered in this Article can serve as an important intervention in
public policy and scholarly discourse by grounding future ADS policies in
the world of practice they intend to govern.
The use cases and definitional analysis also demonstrate that the
motivations to create ADS, their design, and how they are ultimately used are
inextricably linked to policy, social interests, and how these interests are
renegotiated overtime. Both use cases reveal that despite good faith
motivations, ADS can and do produce counterproductive and negative
outcomes, and such outcomes are more likely when: (1) ADS development
or use derives from public policies used to govern social marginality;272 and
(2) when the ADS disproportionately targets or affects communities of color
and poor people.273 Thus, the ADS definitions help clarify the function and
process of these technologies as a prominent mode of governance, and this
understanding can better enable systemic evaluation of ADS, their relevant
social domains, and broader public policy needs.
The definitions account for the variation and uncertainty of ADS in
practice, and their embedded nature in modern politics and society. Often
these systems are ill-defined and are operating on already amorphous and
subjective categories without regard for social or economic costs, such as the
inconsistent definitions of “gangs” in gang databases and measures of “value
added” in standardized teacher evaluations. Yet, my definitions ground these
governing technologies by acknowledging and emphasizing their capacity to
272. Here I am referring to public policy regimes that are more punitive in effect and tend to
stigmatize individuals and groups to justify differential treatment. The use cases demonstrate one
or both of these elements. For example, gang database designation results in more punitive criminal
charges or sanctions. See Richardson & Kak, supra note 189.
273. See e.g., AMREIN-BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at 25–28 (evaluating VAM use in the
Houston Independent School District and noting that terminated teachers were predominantly
women and racial minorities).
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transform liberties, rights, access, safety, and other social outcomes. The
application of the use cases to the narrow definition demonstrates that even a
more constrained definition that prioritizes impact over process or technical
specificity can do better work in regaining accountability for the actors and
institutions that support and use ADS. The analysis of ADS exemptions
showed the technical, social, and political considerations that must be
assessed to avoid exclusion of consequential technologies.
Though my analysis of ADS is critical, I remain optimistic about their
potential as tools for social change. Data-driven solutions should not
foreclose opportunities for systemic re-evaluation of how society is
governed, and the roles of government and technology. Indeed, a more
critical examination of the history, politics, and social dynamics associated
with any ADS and its relationship to governance is crucial for identifying
meaningful pathways forward. The definitions and analytical framework
provided in this Article can aid in identifying appropriate laws, regulations,
and other safeguards for ADS use, such as the types of training government
actors using ADS should receive to better mitigate errors from flawed ADS
or consequences that stem from ADS-human interactions, cumulative
disadvantage, or related social policies.274 This Article can also serve as an
analytical guide for advocates and local communities seeking to evaluate
what social problems can benefit from government or technological
interventions versus community-based solutions.

274. See, e.g., De-Arteaga et al., supra note 45, at 9 (noting that an unanswered question from
research is whether prior experience in the role before ADS use and training can affect government
actors’ behavior and ADS outcomes).

